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I. INTRODUCTION
B EGINNING in March 2003, the Wall Street Journal ran a series of arti-
cles focusing on hospitals that charge uninsured patients inflated hos-
1. See Review of Hospital Billing and Collections Practices: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
108th Cong. 9 (2004) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Rep. Charles F. Bass,
Member, H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?
dbname=108_househearings&docid=f:95446.pdf (stating that "there are no clear
villains and there are no clear heroes").
* Professor of Law, Albany Law School, Union University. The author wishes
to thank Theresa Colbert, Donna Parent and the Albany Law School Computer
Resources Department staff for technical support, and the research librarians at
the Albany Law School Schaffer Law Library for research assistance.
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pital rates and aggressively hound them to make collections.2 The articles
emphasized the draconian collections methods used by some hospitals,
including residential foreclosures and even "body attachments," where the
patient debtors were jailed until they could pay bail. 3
At the same time, a number of investigational reports were being pub-
lished showing the devastating effects of overwhelming medical debt on
families, coupled with census figures showing an ever-rising number of un-
insured in this country.4 One such report by The Commonwealth Fund
announced findings in June 2003 that hospitals' reluctance to lower
charges to the uninsured resulted in long term debt for the affected fami-
lies. 5 The report also announced that the problem was apparently caused
by unclear federal laws and regulations that had the unintended effect of
discouraging hospitals from offering services at free or reduced rates to
the uninsured.6
During the summer of 2004, the increased attention to the issue of
excessive hospital charges to the uninsured resulted in a wave of class ac-
tion lawsuits across the nation. 7 Uninsured patients alleged that hospitals
charged them substantially higher rates than the hospitals accepted from
private insurance plans, Medicare and Medicaid for comparable services.8
The lawsuits also alleged that the hospitals failed to advise the uninsured
patients of available options for charity care, and then aggressively pur-
sued the patients to make collection on the exorbitant bills.9
Also in the summer of 2004, the Committee on Energy and Com-
merce of the House of Representatives held a hearing to review hospital
billing and collections practices for the uninsured. 10 The hearing fol-
lowed a year-long investigation of the issue, wherein the Committee col-
2. For a further discussion of the Wall Street Journal ("Journal") articles on hos-
pital billing and collections for the uninsured, see infra notes 23-66 and accompa-
nying text.
3. For a further discussion of the aggressive collections methods used by some
hospitals, see infra notes 23-66 and accompanying text.
4. For a further discussion of the devastating effects that medical debt and the
rising number of uninsured have in America, see infra notes 67-98 and accompany-
ing text.
5. For a further discussion of the Commonwealth Fund's report, see infra
notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
6. For a further discussion of the report's suggestion that hospital billing and
collections practices were encouraged by ambiguous federal health care laws, see
infra note 91 and accompanying text.
7. For a further discussion of class action lawsuits alleging excessive medical
charges, see infra notes 116-37 and accompanying text.
8. For a further discussion of the uninsured patients' allegations in the exces-
sive medical charges class action suits, see infra notes 121-36 and accompanying
text.
9. For a further discussion of the types of patient mistreatment alleged in the
class action lawsuits, see infra notes 121-36 and accompanying text.
10. For a further discussion of the hearing held by the Committee on Energy
and Commerce of the House of Representatives to review hospital procedures re-
lating to the uninsured, see infra notes 138-59 and accompanying text.
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lected detailed information from twenty hospital systems on their billing
and collections practices." Thus began an intensive examination of a
healthcare anomaly that was not appreciated by the general population of
healthcare consumers, but which was generally known and accepted by
the healthcare industry for decades: the only segment of society that pays
full and undiscounted charges for hospital care is the uninsured-the very
segment of the population that is least able and likely to pay full charges
for medical care.1 2 Governmental agencies in charge of regulating health-
care have known this, the hospital industry has known this and private
insurers and HMOs have known this; nonetheless, these entities have done
little or nothing to complain about the inequity or press for reform.1 3
This Article will examine how this situation came about and what the
healthcare regulators and industry have done about it. Part II will de-
scribe the Wall Street Journal articles that woke the nation to the exorbitant
hospital charges for uninsured patients. 14 Part III will discuss the findings
of investigational reports that hospitals have largely failed to provide char-
ity care to uninsured patients.' 5 Part IV will explain how hospitals develop
their charges and why the charges have become so much higher than the
rates payable by government plans and private insurers. 16 Part V will look
at the recent wave of class action lawsuits across the country, wherein unin-
sured patients are suing hospitals for what they contend are unreasonable
charges and overly aggressive collections practices.17 Part VI will look at
11. For a further discussion of the Committee's investigation into the billing
and collections procedures used by hospitals on the uninsured, see infra notes 138-
62 and accompanying text.
12. But see Hearing, supra note 1, at 7 (statement of Rep. Greg Walden, Mem-
ber, H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investiga-
tions) (pointing out that of those who went without health insurance for given
year, 8.2% had household income in excess of $75,000 and 20% had household
income over $50,000). Certain uninsured patients are not indigent; uninsured pa-
tients are also those who have the apparent means but choose not to purchase
insurance. See id. (stating that not all uninsured are indigent). Non-indigents who
pay full charges include patients with medical savings accounts and international
visitors who come to the United States for healthcare. See id. at 16 (describing
groups of uninsured patients).
13. See, e.g., id. at 4 (statement of Rep. James C. Greenwood, Member, H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight and Inves-
tigations) (questioning why hospitals did not raise issue of uninsured charges with
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services).
14. For a further discussion of the Wall Street Journal articles that brought the
issue of hospital charges for uninsured patients to the public's attention, see infra
notes 23-66 and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of the investigational reports regarding hospitals'
failures to provide charity care to uninsured patients, see infra notes 67-98 and
accompanying text.
16. For a further discussion of the development of hospital charges and an
explanation of why charges for uninsured patients are so high, see infra notes 99-
115 and accompanying text.
17. For a further discussion of the recent wave of class action lawsuits, see
infra notes 116-37 and accompanying text.
2006]
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the testimony produced at a June 2004 congressional hearing on hospital
billing and collections practices ("congressional hearing"). i8 Part VII will
analyze the respective positions of the hospitals and the federal regulators
on the issue of uninsured charges. 19 Part VIII will examine the initial out-
comes in the federal class actions and Part IX will look at the early out-
comes in the class actions that have been filed in state forums. 20 Part X
will examine the recent changes in hospital billing and collections prac-
tices. 21 Finally, Part XI will state the author's conclusions: the recent
changes in hospital billing and collections practices have alleviated some
of the uninsureds' problems, but numerous others still remain.
22
II. WALL STREET JOURNAL ARTICLES AWAKEN THE NATION TO THE
REALITIES OF HOSPITAL CHARGES TO THE UNINSURED
America first became aware of the issue of exorbitant hospital charges
for the uninsured through a series of Wall Street Journal ("Journal') articles
beginning in March 2003. The articles began by telling the story of
Quinton White, a seventy-seven year-old retired dry-cleaning worker suffer-
ing from kidney and heart ailments who was paying off a hospital debt that
his now-deceased wife had incurred twenty years previously when she was
treated for cancer at Yale-New Haven Hospital.23 The article, Twenty Years
and Still Paying, described how the original $18,740 hospital bill had blos-
somed to nearly $55,000 after the addition of interest and fees.24 The
hospital, through its attorney, put a lien on Mr. White's modest home25 .
and seized most of his bank account. 26 Over time, Mr. White paid the
hospital close to the amount of the original bill, but $39,000 still re-
mained, with interest alone reaching $33,000.27
18. For a further discussion of the testimony regarding hospital billing and
collections practices produced at the congressional hearing, see infra notes 138-62
and accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion of the positions of hospitals and federal regula-
tors, see infra notes 163-204 and accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion of the initial outcomes in the federal class actions,
see infra notes 20543 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the early
outcomes in state class actions, see infra notes 244-64 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of recent changes that have occurred in hospital
billing and collections practices, see infra notes 265-312 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion of the author's conclusions, see infra notes 313-27
and accompanying text.
23. See Lucette Lagnado, Twenty Years and Still Paying, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13,
2003, at BI [hereinafter Lagnado, Twenty Years and Still Paying] (explaining that
patient's husband still owes debt to hospital and that amount is growing due to ten
percent interest charges on original bill).
24. See id. (elaborating growth of debt from medical bills).
25. See id. (stating that lien was placed on White's house in 1983).
26. See id. (stating that hospital's lawyer drained Mr. White's bank account to
pay for his wife's medical bill debt in 1996).
27. See id. (explaining that despite paying almost entire original bill for medi-
cal care, due to interest and other fees, total bill for treatment grew to $55,000).
[Vol. 51: p. 95
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Almost immediately after publication of the White article, the Journal
received over 100 e-mails from readers seeking to help Mr. White.28 Air
France offered Mr. White free round-trip tickets to allow him to realize his
lifelong dream of visiting France.2 9 Dozens of readers offered cash contri-
butions or frequent flyer miles.30 The public reaction led the hospital's
senior vice president to personally phone Mr. White's son to announce
that the hospital was forgiving the debt.3 1 The attorney who had relent-
lessly pursued Mr. White for twenty years followed with a letter stating that
the lien had been lifted from Mr. White's home.32
The Journal followed up with the story of Rebekah Nix.33 Ms. Nix was
a completely different type of patient from Mr. White: she was young (only
twenty-five years old), relatively healthy and a college graduate. 34 But af-
ter declining to maintain her health insurance through her past employer,
she too found herself uninsured and in need of hospital treatment in
April 2002 when she arrived at the New York Methodist Hospital emer-
gency room with severe abdominal pains.35 She was temporarily unem-
ployed, living on unemployment benefits of $1122 a month and unable to
afford health insurance.3 6 After tests confirmed that she had appendicitis,
28. See Lucette Lagnado, Twenty Years-and He Isn't Paying Any More, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 1, 2003, at BI (elaborating on outpouring of sympathy resulting from previ-
ous article).
29. See id. (describing public contributions to White).
30. See id. (documenting outpouring of support).
31. See id. (noting decision of Yale-New Haven Hospital to cancel White's
debt).
32. See id. (summarizing letter from Yale-New Haven Hospital's attorney that
notified White of removal of lien).
33. See Lucette Lagnado, Full Price: A Young Woman, An Appendectomy, and a
$19,000 Debt, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2003, at Al [hereinafter Lagnado, Full Price]
(telling story of uninsured woman saddled with huge medical bills after two days of
inpatient care).
34. See id. (describing patient's background).
35. See id. (accounting events leading to Nix's hospitalization).
36. See id. (describing Nix's status as unemployed with reduced income and,
thus, no health insurance). Ms. Nix qualified for coverage under the 1986 Consol-
idated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), but did not take advantage
of it. See id. (stating that Nix chose not to continue health coverage under health
plan provided by employer). COBRA allows qualified workers to retain their em-
ployer-sponsored health insurance for a limited period of time after they leave
their employment by paying the employer's costs of the coverage plus a two per-
cent administrative fee. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1169 (2000) (detailing plan for con-
tinuing coverage). Most unemployed individuals, however, find it difficult to
afford the COBRA premiums required to retain the coverage. See ROBERT WOOD
JOHNSON FOUND., GOING WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE: NEARLY ONE IN THREE NON-
ELDERLY AMERICANS 11 (2003) [hereinafter GOING WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE],
available at http://covertheuninsuredweek.org/media/GoingWithoutReport.pdf
(finding that only one out of five unemployed workers who were eligible for CO-
BRA coverage purchased it).
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she underwent a one-hour laparoscopic surgery to have her appendix re-
moved.3 7 She left the hospital forty-two hours after her arrival. 38
Ms. Nix learned two weeks later that her hospital bill would be over
$12,000.3 9 She applied for Medicaid, but was turned down because her
unemployment benefits exceeded Medicaid's monthly revenue limit.
40
When the hospital bill arrived about two months later, the total had
climbed to $13,110. 4 1 In addition, Ms. Nix received separate bills totaling
$5000 from the anesthesiologist and other doctors who had seen her at
the hospital. 42 A month later, an updated bill arrived from the hospital,
raising the total to $14,182 by adding a mandatory surcharge for New
York's bad debt and charity care pool. 43 This brought the total for the less
than two-day stay to more than $19,000. 4 4
While the White articles focused on the relentlessness and aggressive-
ness of Yale-New Haven's collections techniques, 45 the Nix article focused
on what the Journal termed "a troubling fact of health-care economics."
46
While governmental programs like Medicare and Medicaid and private in-
surers pay steeply discounted rates that they negotiate with hospitals, pa-
tients who are not covered by healthcare programs or private insurers pay
full charges-i.e., the full retail price that hospitals set for their services.
47
37. See Lagnado, Full Price, supra note 33 (detailing events of surgery).
38. See id. (stating length of hospital stay).
39. See id. (describing note from hospital estimating total bill).
40. See id. (explaining that under New York's Medicaid rules single person's
income cannot exceed $352 per month unless person is certified as disabled).
41. See id. (providing itemized list of charges incurred during hospital visit).
42. See id. (describing other doctors' bills incurred during hospital visit).
When contacted by Nix, the surgeon cut his $2500 bill to $1000. See id. (stating
this type of price-cutting was normally done by surgeon for uninsured patients).
This is still substantially more than the $589 he would receive from Medicare and
the $160 he would receive from Medicaid for the same procedure. See id. (compar-
ing reimbursement rates).
43. See id. (quoting patient as stating: "Tack on another grand I can't pay, but
use it to help someone else"). New York's bad debt and charity care pool reim-
burses hospitals for a portion of their bad debt (bills that a hospital seeks to collect
but is unsuccessful in doing so) and charity care (bills that a hospital voluntarily
waives and does not seek to collect). See LONG ISLAND HEALTH ACCESS MONITORING
PROJECT, THE LONG ISLAND COALITION FOR A NATIONAL HEALTH PLAN, HOSPITAL
COMMUNITY BENEFITS AND FREE CARE PROGRAMS: AN INITIAL STUDY OF SEVEN LONG
ISLAND HOSPITALs 13-14 (2001) [hereinafter STUDY OF SEVEN LONG ISLAND Hospi-
TALs], available at http://www.communitycatalyst.org/resource.php?doc-id=380
(explaining hospital indigent care pool in New York State); id. at 14 (explaining
sources of funds for pool and method of disbursement to hospitals); see also N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-k (McKinney 2002) (describing methodology of pool dis-
bursements). The pool is funded by surcharges on patients' hospital bills. See N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2807-j (McKinney 2002) (stating guidelines for surcharges).
44. See Lagnado, Full Price, supra note 33 (explaining charges).
45. For a further discussion of the White articles, see supra notes 23-32 and
accompanying text.
46. See Lagnado, Full Price, supra note 33.
47. See id. (comparing charges billed by hospitals to uninsured with prices
accepted for patients covered by private insurance, Medicare and Medicaid).
[Vol. 51: p. 95
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Through "the insanity of the system," uninsured patients, those who are
least able to pay, are charged at the highest point of the rate scale. 48 In
fact, these uninsured patients often pay twice, or even several times, the
rates being paid by state and federal programs and private health
insurers.4 9
A later Journal article gave concrete comparisons between hospital
charges and the rates paid by governmental programs and private insur-
ers.50 This article told the story of Paul Shipman, an uninsured individual
who ended up spending twenty-one hours at the Inova Fairfax Hospital in
Fairfax, Virginia, when he experienced chest pains. 5 1 Mr. Shipman ended
up having a stent installed to prop open one of the arteries to his heart.
52
The Journal reported that as a result of this procedure, Mr. Shipman re-
ceived a $29,500 hospital bill, plus a $1000 bill for the ambulance trip, a
$7000 bill from the cardiologist who performed the stent procedure and
several thousand dollars in additional bills for the emergency room visit.53
The twenty-one hours of medical care cost Mr. Shipman nearly $40,000,
an exorbitant bill by any standard.
The Journal then compared the Shipman bills to what the hospital
would receive for the same services from private insurers, Medicare and
Medicaid. 54 While insurance plans might pay a "case based" rate (a flat
dollar amount corresponding to a given diagnosis that covers all of the
care the patient receives at the hospital), the uninsured receive a bill with
line by line charges for every item, down to band-aids and aspirins. 55 The
two systems of pricing result in huge differentials to the bills. 56
48. See id. (quoting Bruce Vladeck, who ran Medicare in 1990s).
49. See Lucette Lagnado, Anatomy of a Hospital Bill; Uninsured Patients Often Face
Big Markups on Small Items; "Rules Are Completely Crazy", WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2004,
at BI [hereinafter Lagnado, Anatomy of a Hospital Bill] (describing different rates
charged to uninsured, governmental plan beneficiaries and privately insured); see
also Hearing, supra note 1, at 20 (statement of Gerard F. Anderson, Director, Johns
Hopkins Center for Hospital, Finance and Management) (stating that "[i]t is now
common for charges to be two to four times higher than costs"); THE LEGAL AID
Soc'y HEALTH LAW UNIT, STATE SECRET: How GOVERNMENT FAILS TO ENSURE THAT
UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED PATIENTS HAVE ACCESS TO STATE CHARITY FUNDS 30
(2003) [hereinafter HEALTH LAW UNIT], available at http://www.legal-aid.org/
Uploads/BDCCReport.pdf (reporting that bill from St. Francis Hospital on Long
Island for 2003 emergency room services, where coverage was denied by patient's
insurer, was more than five times rate hospital would have accepted from insurer).
50. See Lagnado, Anatomy of a Hospital Bill, supra note 49 (explaining rates).
51. See id. (recounting patient's medical condition that prompted hospital
stay).
52. See id. (retelling details of patient's stay in hospital).
53. See id. (elaborating on charges incurred from medical treatment).
54. See id. (comparing hospizal rates charged to uninsured persons with rates
charged to persons with government plan or private insurance coverage).
55. See id. (describing hospitals' line-by-line billing of full charges as similar to
d la carte billing by restaurants).
56. See id. (making billing comparison). Even on a line item basis, the rates
paid by governmental programs, for example, are much less than full charges. For
example, the Journal reported that Shipman's cardiologist's bill for installing the
2006]
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Further, the Journal illustrated the enormous gap between Mr. Ship-
man's charges and the hospital's actual costs. For example, the charge to
Mr. Shipman for the stent was $7560, compared to the manufacturer's
listed retail price of $3,195, a markup of 237%.5 7 The hospital charged
Mr. Shipman $532.50 for three bottles of dye to image his arteries, while
the manufacturer sells the product to hospitals for twenty-eight dollars to
fifty dollars a bottle, a markup of at least 355%.58
In the fall of 2003, the Journal reported on two hospitals in Illinois-
the Carle Foundation Hospital59 and Provena Covenant 6 0 -focusing on
their particularly heartless collections practices. Provena Covenant report-
edly seized a large part of the retirement savings of Harold Quinn, a sixty-
five year old man whose insurance had expired only days before he was
forced to check into the hospital for abdominal pain from kidney stones.6 1
A seven-day stay and one-day outpatient kidney stone removal procedure
left Mr. Quinn with a bill of $34,500, which was the hospital's full charge
for the care.
62
The same article also described a little known practice utilized by the
Carle Foundation ("Carle") known as "body attachment."63 When unin-
sured patients whom Carle had sued for medical debts missed their court
appearances, Carle had them arrested and jailed, thereby requiring them
to pay bail before they could return home. 64 In one case, Carle had exe-
cuted a body attachment on an uninsured part-time musician whose origi-
stent was over $6800, whereas Medicaid would have paid the doctor only a little
over $1000 and Medicare would have paid only about $900. See id. (discussing
Shipman's billing). By these numbers, the cardiologist's charge to Mr. Shipman
was about seven times the rates the doctor would have accepted from Medicare or
Medicaid. See id. (comparing Shipman's bill to rates billed to average Medicare or
Medicaid patient).
57. See id. (comparing charges to costs).
58. See id. (discussing pricing differential). Due to the huge disparity between
costs and charges, some healthcare researchers have speculated whether hospitals
are actually making a profit off billing full charges to the uninsured. See, e.g., SEIU
Hosp. ACcoUNTABILrrY PROJECT, UNINSURED AND OVERCHARGED: How ADVOCATE
HEALTH CARE OVERCHARGES CHICAGO HOSPITAL PATIENTS 9-11 (2003) [hereinafter
UNINSURED AND OVERCHARGED], available at http://www.seiu.org/docUploads/Dis-
criminatoryPricing DPAdvocate.pdf (reporting that data on California hospi-
tals show that some of them are profiting from uninsured collections).
59. See Lucette Lagnado, Medical Seizures: Hospitals Try Extreme Measures to Col-
lect Their Overdue Debts, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2003, at Al [hereinafter Lagnado,
Medical Seizures] (describing one patient's ordeal with Carle Foundation Hospital).
60. See Lucette Lagnado, How a Local Agency Challenged Hospitals' Collections




63. See Lagnado, Medical Seizures, supra note 59.
64. See id. The Journal reported that Yale-New Haven Hospital had likewise
obtained at least sixty-five civil arrest warrants in the prior three years for debtors
who had missed court appearances. See id. Reportedly, body attachments are also
used in Indiana, Kansas, Michigan and Oklahoma to collect medical debt. See id.
[Vol. 51: p. 95
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nal treatment at Carle was for a self-inflicted gunshot wound in a botched
suicide attempt.
65
The Journal articles on hospitals' treatment of the uninsured put a
personal face to the thousands of uninsured patients facing insurmounta-
ble hospital debt. Hospitals had not only failed to offer free or reduced
charges to these patients, but had actually charged them rates that far ex-
ceeded what the hospitals were readily accepting from governmental pro-
grams and private insurance. Moreover, the hospitals apparently availed
themselves of every legal means to make collections, including lawsuits,
liens on residences, arrests, jailings and monthly interest charges that ex-
ceeded the installment payments themselves so that some of these debts,
like Mr. White's, would continue to grow even when the debtor faithfully
made every payment.6 6 The light that the Journal shone on these cruel
practices created a national sense of outrage over the treatment that sup-
posedly charitable hospitals were giving to the uninsured.
III. NUMEROUS REPORTS FIND THAT HOSPITALS GENERALLY WERE NOT
PROVIDING CHARrrY CARE TO THE UNINSURED
At about the same time that the Journal was giving the public a dra-
matic picture of the devastating consequences of medical debt for the un-
insured, a number of investigational reports were being published that
conclusively established the failure of hospitals to provide charity care to
this population. Although the researchers were examining hospitals lo-
cated in different geographical areas, their findings were shockingly simi-
lar: hospitals did not tell the uninsured about charity care, did not offer
charity care, did not discount bills to the uninsured and aggressively pur-
sued payment.
The reports consistently found that most hospitals did not tell unin-
sured patients about the availability of charity care. 67 It was extremely rare
(listing states that use arrest and jailing of patients who miss their court hearings
regarding their hospital debts).
65. See id. (providing example of particularly aggressive use of body
attachment)..
66. For a further discussion of Mr. White's medical bills, see supra notes 23-32
and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., CMTv. ACCESS MONITORING SURVEY, THE ACCESS PROJECT, PAYING
FOR HEALTH CARE WHEN YOU'RE UNINSURED: How MUCH SUPPORT DOES THE SAFETY
NET OFFER? 2 (2003), available at http://www.accessproject.org/downloads/
djfinreport.pdf (reporting that most hospital staffers "never offered to find out if
financial assistance was available"); CONN. CTR. FOR A NEW ECONOMY, UNCHARITA-
BLE CARE: YALE-NEW HAVEN HOSPITAL'S CHARITY CARE AND COLLECTIONS PRACTICES
20 (2003) [hereinafter UNCHARITABLE CARE], http://www.ctneweconomy.org/Pub-
lications/UC.pdf (explaining that debtors in study were mostly unaware of charita-
ble programs offered by New Haven); STUDY OF SEVEN LONG ISLAND HOSPITALS,
supra note 43, at 8 (describing lack of information given to surveyors on free care
policies offered at seven hospitals studied); see also LONG ISLAND HEALTH ACCESS
MONITORING PROJECT, THE LONG ISLAND COALITION FOR A NATIONAL HEALTH PLAN,
HOSPITAL FREE CARE PROGRAM: A STUDY OF SIXTEEN LONG ISLAND HOSPITALS 2
2006]
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to locate hospitals having a well-defined policy of charity care that was ex-
plained to uninsured patients. 68 In fact, staffers at many hospitals were
unable or flatly refused to provide any information on free care 69 and
many hospitals mistakenly stated that free care was unavailable.70 Not sur-
prisingly, most uninsured patients did not receive free care 7 1 or any sub-
stantial reduction to their hospital bills.
72
Compounding the problem, as confirmed by the researchers, was that
the surveyed hospitals all charged the uninsured full undiscounted
charges. For example, a study of Chicago area hospitals found that each
hospital charged uninsured patients up to twice the payments the hospi-
tals accepted from insurance plans. 73 The researchers found that the vic-
tims of such "discriminatory pricing" were largely the working poor.
7 4
Due to the exorbitant rates, the average inpatient hospital bill for unin-
sured services often amounted to twenty-seven percent to fifty-nine per-
cent of the median annual income within the locality, virtually
guaranteeing that the uninsured patient would be unable to pay the bill.
75
Even if the patient were not sued and thus managed to avoid the tacked
on court costs and legal fees, most hospitals charged interest that contin-
ued to accrue on unpaid portions of the bill. 76
(2003) [hereinafter STUDY OF SIXTEEN LONG ISLAND HOSPITALS], available at http:/
/www.communitycatalyst.org/resource.php?doc id=256 (explaining that not one
of sixteen hospitals surveyed informed patients of available free care for low in-
come or uninsured).
68. See, e.g., STUDY OF SIXTEEN LONG ISLAND HOSPITALS, supra note 67, at 2
(reporting that most hospitals surveyed did not inform surveyors that free care was
available to low income patients, and did not provide written free care policy).
69. See id. at 3 (reporting that at majority of hospitals surveyed, billing staff
did not know if free care was available).
70. See, e.g., STUDY OF SEVEN LONG ISLAND HOSPITALS, supra note 43, at 8.
71. See, e.g., UNINSURED AND OVERCHARGED, supra note 58, at 3.
72. See id. at 2 (stating that financial assistance offered to uninsured most
often consisted of offer to allow payment of full bill in installments, rather than
discounting or waiving charges); see also Hearing, supra note 1, at 75 (statement of
Gerard F. Anderson, Director, Johns Hopkins Center for Hospital, Finance and
Management) (explaining that it is difficult for uninsured to negotiate discounted
rates pre-treatment, because charges are per item, and parties do not know ahead
of time what items and services will be required).
73. See generally Hosp. ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT OF THE SERV. EMPLOYEES INT'L
UNION, WHY THE WORKING POOR PAY MORE: A REPORT ON THE DISCRIMINATORY
PRICING OF HEALTH CARE 1 (2003) [hereinafter WORKING POOR], available at http:/
/www.seiu.org/docUploads/Discriminatory-Pricing--whyworking-poor-pay-
more.pdf (finding that uninsured patients paid average of forty-eight percent
more than uninsured patients); UNINSURED AND OVERCHARGED, supra note 58, at 2
(reporting substantially higher charges to uninsured).
74. See WORKING POOR, supra note 73, at 2 (identifying victims of inflated pric-
ing as those who earn too much to qualify for Medicaid, but too little to afford
private insurance).
75. See id. (describing disparities in bills to insured versus uninsured for emer-
gency treatment and financial effect of such disparities on uninsured families).
76. See THE ACCESS PROJECT, THE CHAMPAIGN COUNT'Y HEALTH CARE CONSUM-
ERS, HUMAN SERVICES COAL. OF DADE COUNTY, TENANTS' AND WORKERS' SUPPORT
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Further, when hospitals reported their amounts of bad debt and char-
ity care, they often reported in terms of charges, not CoStS. 7 7 This poten-
tially created a misconception that hospitals were shouldering a much
larger burden of charity care than they actually were.
78
Several of the studies also confirmed the Journal reports that exposed
the hospitals' relentless pursuit of collections from uninsured patients.
The most damning, titled Uncharitable Care, focused on Yale-New Haven
Hospital's practices of suing uninsured patients, garnishing their wages,
seizing their bank accounts and foreclosing on their homes, even when
relatively small amounts were at stake. 79 In one case, the hospital sued to
foreclose on a patient's home to collect a debt of only $4000.80
Other reports focused on the massive scope of the problem. The
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation reported that, according to Census Bu-
reau figures, there were 41 million uninsured persons in the United States
in 2001.81 When persons who were uninsured for only a part of the year
COMM., THE CONSEQUENCES OF MEDICAL DEBT: EVIDENCE FROM THREE COMMUNITIES
18 (2003) [hereinafter CONSEQUENCES OF MEDICAL DEBT], available at http://www.
accessproject.org/downloads/med-eseng.pdf (reporting that often interest con-
tinued to accrue even when patient was making installment payments); see also
CHAMPAIGN COUNTY ILL. BD. OF REVIEW, NOTES ON EXEMPT APPLICATIONS 7 (2003),
available at http://www.co.champaign.il.us/SOAOFF/PROVENA.pdf (finding in-
terest charges of 12.9% when patients financed their debt to Provena via financing
plan suggested by Provena through Capstone Bank, N.A.).
77. See, e.g., UNCHARITABLE CARE, supra note 67, at 12 (stating that value of
Yale-New Haven's bad debt and free care is reported in terms of charges, not at
hospital's cost of providing services).
78. See, e.g., UNINSURED AND OVERCHARGED, supra note 58, at 10-11 (reporting
that Advocate Health Care "distorts the value of the charity care its hospitals pro-
vide by reporting charity care amounts as gross charges, rather than as the cost of
providing the care").
79. See UNCHARITABLE CARE, supra note 67, at 7 (describing aggressive collec-
tions practices by Yale-New Haven Hospital); see also CAROL PRYOR & ROBERT SEI-
FERT, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: How FEDERAL
REGULATIONS AND HOSPITAL POLICIES CAN LEAVE PATIENTS IN DEBT 14 (2003) [here-
inafter PRYOR, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES], available at http://www.accessproject.
org/downloads/unintended.pdf (reporting that in 2001, Yale-New Haven Hospital
"filed 134 new property liens in New Haven, almost 20 times the number filed by
the city's other hospital").
80. See UNCHARITABLE CARE, supra note 67, at 7 (describing case of Sondra
Henderson, among others, who was sued by Yale-New Haven Hospital in late 1990s
for approximately $4000, which she had incurred as uninsured admitted for heart
condition, where hospital ultimately won default foreclosure on her home, forcing
Henderson to pay $10,313, including interest, costs and legal fees to settle case and
retain residence).
81. See GOING WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 36, at 1 (stating num-
ber of people in 2001 "who did not have any type of health insurance at any point
in time during the entire year"). The figure in New York City alone was over 1.8
million uninsured in 2001. See HEALTH LAW UNIT, supra note 49, at 7; see also CITI-
ZENS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF MICH., HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE AND UNINSURED/
UNCOMPENSATED CARE IN MICHIGAN HOSPITALS 12 (2002), available at http://www.
crcmich.org/PUBLICAT/2000s/2002/memolO6l.pdf (reporting that "[t]here are
indications that numbers [of Michigan uninsured] may be on the rise again [after
2006]
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were considered, the figure rose to approximately 74.7 million under the
age of sixty-five, or nearly one out of every three persons. 8 2 Surprisingly,
nearly four out of five individuals who went without health insurance dur-
ing 2001-2002 were employed, 83 confirming the findings of other studies
that it is predominantly the working poor, not the unemployed, who go
without health insurance.84
The reports also confirmed that the consequences of medical debt on
the uninsured caused substantial changes in their lives. Medical debtors
found it difficult to obtain bank loans and credit cards; worked longer
hours to meet their basic needs; and battled stress, anxiety and "feelings of
hopelessness." 85 A study of healthcare on Long Island found that the un-
insured often did not get needed medical care because they could not
afford it.8 6 A study of the Chicago area found that the uninsured were
often denied access due to providers' requirements that the uninsured pay
cash up-front or due to providers' refusals to treat because of outstanding
bills.8 7 Ironically, the denial of access to medical care for the uninsured
often resulted in their use of more costly hospital emergency depart-
2001] as a result of the weakened economy and the rising cost of health
insurance").
82. See GOING WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 36, at 1 (noting that
almost two-thirds of individuals in study were uninsured for six months or more);
see also Hearing, supra note 1, at 5 (statement of Rep. Diana DeGette, Member, H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations)
(noting that forty-three to eighty-one million Americans go without health insur-
ance for at least part of year).
83. See GOING WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 36, at 5 (observing
that most uninsured were employed).
84. See, e.g., WORKING POOR, supra note 73, at 2 (reporting that sixty-four per-
cent of uninsured adults in Illinois in 2001 were employed).
85. See CONSEQUENCES OF MEDICAL DEBT, supra note 76, at 18-21 (providing
testimonials from individuals affected by large medical debt).
86. See generally LONG ISLAND HEALTH ACCESS MONITORING PROJECT, THE LONG
ISLAND COAL. FOR A NAT'L HEALTH PLAN, NEGLECTED AND INVISIBLE: UNDERSTAND-
ING THE UNMET HEALTHCARE NEEDS OF PEOPLE ON LONG ISLAND 32 (2002) [herein-
after NEGLECTED AND INVISIBLE], available at http://www.accessproject.org/
downloads/_DI%2OFinal%2OReport45.pdf (describing uninsureds' need for medi-
cal services, prescription drugs and dental coverage). Some researchers have
noted that hospitals' debt and collections activities can adversely affect patients'
health. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 28 (statement of Melissa B. Jocoby, Associate
Professor, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (noting that " [ slome re-
searchers are concerned specifically about the negative impact of indebtedness
and related financial trouble on certain diseases and conditions").
87. See CONSEQUENCES OF MEDICAL DEBT, supra note 76, at 13 (detailing vari-
ous bars to access to medical treatment); see also HEALTH LAW UNIT, supra note 49,
at 35 (reporting that eight of twenty-two New York hospitals interviewed regularly
asked uninsured patients to pay 100% of their anticipated bill prior to admission).
A financial representative from New York University Hospital has been quoted as
saying that "people have to pay for the services they receive here ... [and] if they
can't pay, they have to just get the hell out!" See id. at 20; see also PRYOR, UNIN-
TENDED CONSEQUENCES, supra note 79, at 3 (reporting on study where more than
half of low-income healthcare consumers with medical debts told researchers that
their medical debts made it harder for them to get medical care, as providers re-
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ments, 88 where the hospitals are required to screen and treat by the Emer-
gency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTAIA).89
One of the more influential reports, by The Commonwealth Fund,
was unique in suggesting regulatory causes for the hospitals' billing full
charges to the uninsured.90 The report stated that federal fraud and
abuse laws aimed at preventing overbilling to the Medicare system may
have inadvertently inhibited hospitals from offering reduced charges and
from forgiving debt.9 1 The report, however, also faulted hospitals for fail-
ing to have formal policies for identifying and connecting uninsured pa-
tients to programs that were available to provide free or reduced-cost
care.
9 2
Several reports were especially critical of New York's bad debt and
charity care system.9 3 While New York hospitals can recover a portion of
their bad debts and charity care from a statewide pool, 94 there are no
requirements for hospitals to alert patients to the existence of the pool or
to provide minimal levels of charity care. 9 5 Not only do New York hospi-
quired cash pre-payment, refused care or encouraged them to go to other
providers).
88. See GOING WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 36, at 14 (stating that
uninsured adults are four times more likely to use emergency room for care); NE-
GLECTED AND INVISIBLE, supra note 86, at 27, 32 (finding that more than half of
respondents who reported family use of emergency room said it was due to lack of
insurance or inability to pay).
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000) (requiring hospitals to provide medical
screening exam to determine whether emergency condition exists when patients
come to hospital emergency department and make request for treatment, and if
emergency condition is identified, requiring hospital to provide stabilizing treat-
ment within its capability, or to transfer patient to another facility that can provide
such treatment).
90. See PRYOR, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES, supra note 79, at 4 (suggesting
regulatory reasons for hospitals' uninsured billing practices).
91. See id. (referring to Medicare rules that prohibit providers from waiving
collection and require providers to set uniform fees).
92. See generally id. at 12-18 (describing shortfalls in hospitals' billing
practices).
93. See generally HEALTH LAW UNIT, supra note 49, at 8-13 (describing New
York State laws governing hospital bad debt and charity care and explaining how
system fails to aid uninsured patients); PUB. POLICY AND EDUC. FUND OF N.Y., HosP-
TAL FREE CARE: CAN NEW YORKERS ACCESS HOSPITAL SERVICES PAID FOR BY OUR TAX
DOLLARS? 14-24 (2003) [hereinafter NEW YORK HOSPITAL FREE CARE],available at
http://www.communitycatalyst.org/resource.php?doc-id=177 (analyzing data col-
lected in survey of New York hospitals and showing failure of hospitals to provide
charity care).
94. See HEALTH LAW UNIT, supra note 49, at 20 (reporting that pool distribu-
tions for 2001 covered approximately fifty percent of hospitals' cost of providing
uncompensated care); NEW YoRK HOSPITAL FREE CARE, supra note 93, at 25 (stating
that seventy hospitals surveyed received more than $400 million from New York's
bad debt and charity care pool).
95. See NEW YoRK HOSPITAL FREE CARE, supra note 93, at 27-28. The source
reports:
New York State spent $847 million dollars a year [for 2002-2003] through
the HCRA Indigent Care and High Need Indigent Care Adjustment
2006]
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tals bill the uninsured an added tax for the state's bad debt and charity
care pool,96 but when the hospital collects from the pool to compensate it
for a portion of its uncollected bills, those collections never get credited to
specific patients. 9 7 This enables New York hospitals to continue to pursue
uninsured patients for collection even after the hospitals have collected
from the pool to compensate them, at least in part, for those uncollected
debts.
9 8
IV. HOSPITAL CHARGES-How THEY ARE DETERMINED, WHY THEY ARE
So HIGH AND THE INEQUITY THIS PRODUCES FOR THE UNINSURED
Historically, hospitals set their charges in much the same manner as
any other industry. They had discretion to set whatever charges they de-
termined would be sufficient to cover their costs and give them a predeter-
mined level of profit, keeping in mind the charges sought by competing
hospitals in their local markets. 9 9 Beginning in the early 1980s, however,
managed care plans began demanding negotiated discounts. 10 0 In many
Pools, but there is no accountability by hospitals on how many uninsured
and underinsured individuals they treat as a result of receiving funds
from the pools .... [T]here is no real basis for determining whether they
provide care to the neediest patients.
Id.; see also HEALTH LAw UNIT, supra note 49, at 9 ("Hospitals do not have to actu-
ally provide access to free or reduced fee care funds to individual uninsured or
underinsured patients in exchange for these [bad debt and charity care pool]
funds.").
96. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2807j (McKinney 2002) (requiring
surcharges to be paid for services provided to all non-Medicare patients); see also
Lagnado, Full Price, supra note 33 (reporting that New York Methodist Hospital's
bill for uninsured patient Rebekah Nix included tax of $1072 for bad debt and
charity care pool contribution).
97. See HEALTH LAW UNIT, supra note 49, at 2 (describing how hospitals' re-
ceipt of bad debt and charity care funds from state pool does not benefit individ-
ual uninsured).
98. See id. at 11 (providing illustration wherein uninsured patient is pursued
by hospital for full charges, even though hospital collects fifty percent of its costs
from state's pool). New York has also come under fire for a state law that allows
debt collectors, acting on the hospitals' behalf, to go after old court judgments
against patients and attach their bank accounts electronically. See Lucette
Lagnado, Cold-Case Files: Dunned for Old Bills, Poor Find Some Hospitals Never Forget,
WALL ST. J., June 8, 2004, at Al (describing New York law that allows electronic
attachment of bank accounts). See generally N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(a), (g) (McKinney
Supp. 2001) (describing statutory process for debt collection by use of restraining
notice).
99. See, e.g., Lucette Lagnado, Medical Shift: Hospitals Will Give Price Breaks to
Uninsured, if Medicare Agrees, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2003, at Al [hereinafter
Lagnado, Medical Shift] (stating that in 1960s, "hospital charges generally reflected
the cost of providing care plus a modest profit"); see also Hearing, supra note 1, at 19
(statement of Gerard F. Anderson, Director, Johns Hopkins Center for Hospital,
Finance and Management) (noting that in 1960s and 1970s hospitals had "com-
plete discretion" to establish their charges).
100. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 19 (statement of Gerard F. Anderson, Direc-
tor, Johns Hopkins Center for Hospital, Finance and Management) (explaining
that in early 1980s managed care plans began negotiating discounts off hospitals'
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cases, these negotiated rates for managed care plans were expressed as
percentage discounts off charges. 1 1
In the mid-1980s Medicare and Medicaid largely converted to "case
based" rates of payment, whereby they paid hospitals one set price for all
services rendered to an inpatient with a particular diagnosis. 10 2 Although
the case based methodology was not related to the hospitals' charges, the
governmental programs still used charges to calculate payments for "out-
lier" cases, i.e., cases where complications required, for example, a longer
inpatient stay or a more intensive use of hospital resources, thereby ren-
dering the case based rate inadequate. 10 3
For the past twenty years, health insurers, managed care plans and
governmental programs have all sought to drive down their rates for hos-
pital care, 10 4 which often comprises the largest segment of expense for
healthcare insurers. 10 5 Because the hospital rates payable by health insur-
ers, managed care plans and governmental programs (covering the major-
ity of hospitals' patients) 10 6 were not full charges and often times were
quite a bit less than the hospitals' charge levels, there was little incentive
for state or federal governments to regulate charges. 10 7 Additionally,
charges in return for placing hospitals in plans' networks); see also Lucette
Lagnado, Medical Markup: California Hospitals Open Books, Showing Huge Price Differ-
ences, WALL ST.J., Dec. 27, 2004, at Al [hereinafter Lagnado, Medical Markup] (stat-
ing that during 1990s HMOs demanded "steep discounts off retail prices" from
hospitals).
101. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 1, at 114 (statement ofJack 0. Bovender, Jr.,
Chairman and CEO, the Hospital Corporation of America) (providing that many
negotiated rates with managed care providers are based on discounts off charges).
102. See, e.g., Lagnado, Full Price, supra note 33 (reporting that beginning in
mid-1980s Medicare started basing payments on standardized diagnostic codes re-
lated to patients' diagnoses rather than to hospitals' charges).
103. See Marilyn Werber Serafini, Sticker Shock, 35 NAT'LJ. 3180 (2003) (stat-
ing that Medicare pays extra outlier payments for sickest patients who accrue high-
est charges).
104. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 1, at 19 (statement of Gerard F. Anderson,
Director, Johns Hopkins Center for Hospital, Finance and Management) (ac-
knowledging that by 1990, federal and state governments, private insurers and
managed care plans were no longer paying charges to hospitals, but were instead
using case based rate methodologies or negotiating discounts with hospitals).
105. See RAND E. ROSENBLATr ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM 467-68 (David L. Shapiro et al. eds., 1997) (stating that hospitals receive
largest portion of money spent on healthcare).
106. See id. at 468 (explaining that in 1993 hospitals received 36% of their
revenues from private insurers, 28% from Medicare, 13% from Medicaid, 15%
from other federal programs, 5% from philanthropic or non-patient income and
only 3% from patients directly).
107. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 19 (statement of Gerard F. Anderson, Direc-
tor, Johns Hopkins Center for Hospital, Finance and Management) (indicating
that when federal and state governments, private insurers and managed care plans
ceased paying full charges by 1990, "the regulatory and market constraints on hos-
pital charges were virtually eliminated"). For example, before New York deregu-
lated hospital rates in 1997, charges could not be more than twenty percent above
the case based rates payable by commercial insurers. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw
2006]
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there was little incentive for the hospitals to decrease their charges be-
cause many of the negotiated rates continued to be structured as discounts
off charges.10 8 High charges could also trigger extra outlier payments
from Medicare, encouraging hospitals to keep their charges high.109 As a
result, charges continued to climb.
As such, the only patient group that did not benefit from the drive
down of hospital rates was the uninsured. 110 The employed population
largely came to receive health insurance benefits through their employers'
health benefit plans."1 The age sixty-five and older population became
covered by Medicare.' 12 The extremely indigent often met the state's cri-
§ 2807-c(1)(c) (McKinney 2002) (stating statutory limits for charge based pay-
ments). Now, nearly nine years post-deregulation, according to the Greater New
York Hospital Association, charges average eighty-seven percent above hospitals'
costs. See Lagnado, Full Price, supra note 33 (describing "ballooned" charges by
hospitals well beyond cost of providing treatment). Hospital charges in California
have reportedly reached 178% above costs. See id. Most states currently have aver-
age hospital charges of at least 100% above costs. See Serafini, supra note 103(comparing average state hospital charges to costs for the years 1997 and 2002;
noting that hospital charges, for the most part, greatly outweighed hospital costs).
In contrast, in Maryland, where hospital charges are still regulated, charges aver-
age only twenty-eight percent above costs. See Lagnado, Full Price, supra note 33(highlighting lower hospital charges in state that regulates hospital rates).
108. See PRYOR, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES, supra note 79, at 17 (reporting
that hospitals' use of charges as basis for negotiating discounts with public and
private insurers may lead hospitals to keep charges high); Lagnado, Medical Shift,
supra note 99 (stating that hospitals began boosting their charges in 1980s "as an
effort to set a higher starting point for negotiations [with HMOs]").
109. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 127-28 (statement of Rep. James C. Green-
wood, Member, H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Chairman, Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations) (indicating that outliers were reimbursed by Medi-
care on ratio formula with cost as numerator and charge as denominator, creating
incentive for hospitals to set their charges as high as possible); Serafini, supra note
103 (stating that to determine whether particular patient qualifies as outlier, Medi-
care determines difference between hospital's charges and costs, but as cost lists
used by Medicare were two years old, hospital could increase charges to create
greater difference between costs and charges, triggering outlier payment). In Au-
gust of 2003, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services changed its outlier
reimbursement rules to remove the troubling incentive, creating a system where
rapid increases in gross charges do not increase outlier payments. See Hearing,
supra note 1, at 142-43 (statement of Herb Kuhn, Director, Center for Medicare
Management, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services) (providing that new regulations "tighten the time
period between costs and charges" so that hospitals no longer have the opportu-
nity "to accelerate charges because of. . . incentives in the Medicare program").
110. See Lagnado, Medical Shift, supra note 99 (reporting that uninsured were
"[l] ost in the mix," billed at full charges, unaware of discounted rates and with no
one to negotiate discounts for them).
111. See ROSENBLAT-r ET AL., supra note 105, at 38 (stating that most important
determinant of health insurance coverage was employment, with nearly two-thirds
of non-elderly having employment-based coverage).
112. See id. at 369-70 (asserting that generally, Medicare Part A (covering hos-
pital services) covers individuals who are age sixty-five or older and who have paid
social security taxes for at least ten years).
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teria to qualify for Medicaid.' 1 3 All these groups paid discounted hospital
rates or case based rates. 1 14 A portion of the middle class, however, either
newly unemployed or not covered by an employer sponsored health bene-
fit plan, did not qualify for Medicaid and was not old enough to be cov-
ered by Medicare. It was only this group of uninsured patients that was
left to pay full charges when they received hospital services.
11 5
V. NATION-WIDE WAVE OF CLASS ACTIONS CHALLENGES HOSPITALS'
UNINSURED BILLING AND COLLECTIONS PRACTICES
Beginning in the summer of 2004, uninsured patients across the
United States commenced a number of class action lawsuits against hospi-
tals alleging excessive charges and overly aggressive collections prac-
tices. 116 The litigations were coordinated by Richard F. Scruggs,1 1 7 the
Oxford, Mississippi, attorney who had successfully represented plaintiffs in
the tobacco class actions.1 18 ByJanuary 2005, more than seventy such law-
suits had been commenced in federal courts in more than forty states, with
113. According to the New York State Department of Health's Website, a sin-
gle individual may qualify for Medicaid if he or she receives no more than $667 in
income per month. See N.Y. State Dep't of Health, Medicaid, http://www.health.
state.ny.us/health_care/medicaid/index.htm#qualify (last visited Nov. 12, 2005)
(presenting Medicaid eligibility chart).
114. For example, the standard 2003 charge for a hysterectomy at North
Shore University Hospital in Manhasset, New York, was $21,508; however, Medi-
caid paid $8456, Medicare paid $7600 and private insurers and HMOs paid ap-
proximately the same rate as Medicare. See Lagnado, Medical Shift, supra note 99
(describing differences in billing insured versus uninsured patients).
115. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 5 (statement of Rep. Diana DeGette, Mem-
ber, H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investiga-
tions) (noting that "the uninsured are the only ones who have no advocate [to
negotiate a discounted hospital rate]"). Professor Elizabeth Warren of Harvard
Law School has accurately summarized the current situation, stating: "there is no
one to negotiate on behalf of people without insurance." See UNINSURED AND
OVERCHARGED, supra note 58, at 7 (quoting Professor Elizabeth Warren).
116. See generally Pending Litigation: NonProfit Hospital Charity Care Litigation, 13
Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1555, 1555-75 (2004) (providing chart summarizing status
of charity care class action lawsuits filed in federal district courts as of October
2004).
117. See Charity Care Litigation Sees New Filing as Defense's Theories, Strategies
Evolve, 13 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1318, 1318 (2004) (describing Scruggs' coordinat-
ing role in class actions).
118. See Charity Care Class Action Litigation Is Denied Federal Status, 17 HEALTH
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more than 600 hospitals named as defendants. 1 19 Dozens of similar class
actions were also commenced in state forums. 120
For the most part, the various state and federal complaints made the
same allegations. The chief claim was that by receiving federal charitable
tax exemption under § 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 1 21 the
hospitals had entered into an express or implied contract with the federal
119. See NFP Litigation Update: Early Decisions by Federal Courts Favor Hospitals, 14
Health L. Rep. (BNA) 79, 79 (2005) (providing update on statute of charity care
class actions); Pending Litigation: NonProfit Hospital Charity Care Litigation, supra note
116, at 1555 (summarizing status of lawsuits filed in federal courts against not-for-
profit hospitals); see also MultidistrictJudicial Panel Rejects Motion to Consolidate, Trans-
fer Charity Care Cases, 13 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1533, 1533 (2004) (reporting on
new rulings in charity care class actions).
Yale-New Haven Hospital was particularly hard hit. Not only was it targeted by
the Journal articles, but it was also sued in February 2003 by the Connecticut Attor-
ney General for hoarding "free bed funds" by failing to distribute the funds to
uninsured patients in need of charity care. See Attorney General Sues New Haven
Hospital Over Failure to Use Indigent-Care Donations, 12 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 319,
319 (2003) (reporting on lawsuit); David M. Herszenhorn, Connecticut Sues Yale-
New Haven Hospital, Saying It Hoarded Money Donated for the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21,
2003, at B5 (discussing lawsuit). For a further discussion on the Journal's expos6
on Yale-New Haven Hospital's treatment of uninsured patients, see supra notes 23-
32, 45 and accompanying text. In December 2003, the hospital was sued in state
court by the Service Employees International Union 1199 (New England) for alleg-
edly overcharging low-income patients and harassing them for payment. See Con-
necticut: Hospitals Sued for Misuse of Indigent Care Funds, Am. HEALTH LINE, Dec. 17,
2003, at "In The Courts" (reporting on lawsuit). That same month, Yale-New Ha-
ven hospital was again sued in state court by a class of plaintiffs alleging misuse of
its free bed funds. See generally Ahmad v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., Inc., No. UWY-
CV-04-0183725-s (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 2003), available at http://www.jud2.
state.ct.us/civil_inquiry/DispDetail.asp?DocNum=WY-CV-04-0183725-S (last vis-
ited Nov. 18, 2005) (providing information regarding pending litigation). In Sep-
tember 2004, the hospital was sued by a class of plaintiffs in Connecticut's federal
district court alleging excessive charges and aggressive collections practices. See
generally Complaint at 10, Rivera v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., Inc., No. 3:04-CV-1515
(D. Conn. Feb. 8, 2005) (presenting class action complaint against Yale-New Haven
Hospital). This case, however, was dismissed five months after filing. See Claims
Against Yale-New Haven Hospital Dismissed in Oral Ruling by Federal Court, 14 Health
L. Rep. (BNA) 241, 241 (2005) (reporting that U.S. District Court for District of
Connecticut, in oral ruling issued on February 8, 2005, granted defendants' mo-
tion to dismiss).
120. See Multidistrict Judicial Panel Rejects Motion to Consolidate, Transfer Charity
Care Cases, supra note 119, at 1533 (stating that as of fall 2004, approximately forty
additional state court actions had been filed).
121. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (3) (2000). The statute provides that an organiza-
tion may be exempt from taxation if it is:
[O]rganized and operated exclusively for... charitable... purposes, ....
no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is
carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation
... and which does not participate in, or intervene in ... any political
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public
office.
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government obliging them to provide charity care. 12 2 Plaintiffs alleged
that when they were billed excessive charges for hospital services and were
aggressively pursued by the hospitals for collection, the hospitals were in
breach of their charitable obligations.1 23 Plaintiffs also asserted various
state and federal claims against the hospitals for breach of express or im-
plied charitable duties, 124 breach of the duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing,125 breach of charitable trust 126 and unjust enrichment, 12 7 but these
claims were premised, at least in part, upon the same legal theory that the
hospitals' charitable tax exemption under § 501(c) (3) created an express
or implied contract with the government to furnish charity care.
128
Various plaintiffs asserted additional federal claims. Some alleged vi-
olations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 129 asserting
that the hospital's "aggressive, abusive and humiliating collection prac-
tices" were prohibited by the FDCPA. 130 Others asserted violations of EM-
TALA,1 3 1 based on the hospitals' alleged insistence that the plaintiffs sign
payment guarantees before receiving emergency treatment. 13 2 Some
plaintiffs asserted civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
violations of the equal protection provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, 133 claiming that the hospitals had engaged in invidious dis-
crimination against uninsured patients by charging them more than in-
122. See, e.g., Complaint 27, Carlson v. Long IslandJewish Med. Ctr., No. CV
04-3086 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 2004) (alleging existence of express or implied contract
under 26 U.S.C. § 501 (c) (3) as bases of breach of contract claims).
123. See id. 11 30-36, 70-79 (elaborating on alleged breaches of charitable
duties).
124. See id. 11 70-79.
125. See id. 11 80-83.
126. See id. 11 88-92.
127. See id. 11 98-101.
128. See id. (explaining that basis for all claims stemmed from reading
§ 501 (c) (3) as creating express or implied contract between hospitals and govern-
ment to furnish charity care in exchange for tax exemption).
129. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2000) (targeting unfair collections procedures by
independent debt collectors).
130. See, e.g., Complaint 1 86, Carlson, No. CV 04-3086 (arguing that Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) prohibited hospitals' collections practices).
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000) (prohibiting hospitals from, inter alia, de-
nying or delaying emergency screening and treatment). For a further discussion
of Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), see supra note
89.
132. See, e.g., Complaint 11 135-39, Rivera v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., Inc., No.
3:04-CV-1515 (D. Conn. Feb. 8, 2005).
133. See U.S. CONsT. amends. V, XIV, § 1 (providing due process protection).
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment states: "nor shall any person...
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." U.S.
CONsT. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that
"no state shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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sureds for the same services.1 3 4 Finally, plaintiffs asserted various state law
claims, such as breach of express contracts 135 and violations of state con-
sumer fraud statutes.13 6 Plaintiffs named the American Hospital Associa-
tion (AHA) as an additional defendant, alleging that the AHA had
conspired with the hospitals and aided and abetted the alleged
breaches.
1 3 7
VI. HOSPITALS AND HHS FACE OFF AT THE CONGRESSIONAL HEARING ON
HOSPITALS' BILLING AND COLLECTIONS PRACTICES
In the summer of 2003, the House Energy and Commerce Committee
commenced an investigation of hospital billing and collections practices,
sending letters to twenty hospitals and hospital systems nationwide asking
detailed questions about their charity care policies. 138 A year later, the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations convened a hearing on the
problem, taking testimony from a number of health policy researchers,
hospital industry representatives and representatives from the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Office of Inspector Gen-
eral (OIG) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS). 13 9
The researchers reiterated their findings regarding the magnitude of
the problem of medical debt for the uninsured. 140 Further, they con-
firmed that hospital reimbursement methodologies incentivized hospitals
134. See, e.g., Burton v. William Beaumont Hosp., 347 F. Supp. 2d 486, 498
(E.D. Mich. 2004) (discussing plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim).
135. See id. at 499 (detailing plaintiffs' breach of contract claim).
136. See, e.g., Complaint 93-97, Carlson v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr.,
No. CV 04-3086 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 2004) (asserting violations of New York's con-
sumer fraud law); see also N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349 (McKinney 2004) (prohibiting
deceptive business practices). Moreover, others of plaintiffs' various common law
claims, such as breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, could also be
premised upon principles of New York common law. See, e.g., Complaint 80-83,
Carlson, No. CV 04-3086 (asserting claim for breach of good faith and fair dealing).
137. See Complaint 43-46, 102-116, Carlson, No. CV 04-3086 (alleging that
American Hospital Association (AHA) conceals and misrepresents amount of char-
ity care provided by its member hospitals and that it falsely asserts that its billing is
required by Medicare regulations).
138. See Lucette Lagnado, House Panel Begins Inquiry into Hospital Billing Prac-
tices, WALL ST. J.,July 17, 2003, at BI (recounting investigation of hospital billing
and collections practices commenced by House Committee).
139. See Hearing, supra note 1, at III (listing names of witnesses appearing at
hearing, including: researchers from the Johns Hopkins Center for Hospital Fi-
nance and Management; The Commonwealth Fund; the University of North Caro-
lina at Chapel Hill School of Law; the Access Project; hospital representatives from
Hospital Corporation of America, Tenet Healthcare Corporation, Catholic Health
Initiatives, New York Presbyterian Hospital, and Ascension Health; representatives
of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS); and representatives of Of-
fice of Inspector General (OIG)).
140. See id. at 15 (statement of Rep. Allen, Member, House Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations) (asserting that medical debt is leading cause of per-
sonal bankruptcy in United States).
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to retain high charges and that states' deregulation of hospital rates
largely had removed charges from governmental limitations. 141
Representatives of the hospital industry defended their charity care
practices, emphasizing that they ended up "writing off' most uninsured
bills.1 42 The hospitals also explained that most of their managed care con-
tracts were structured as percentage discounts off charges; thus, lowering
charges would have huge impacts on all of the managed care rates col-
lected by the hospitals, not just their rates to the uninsured.1 43
The hospitals' primary defense at the hearing, set forth in a white
paper produced by the AHA, 144 was that federal regulations governing
Medicare had restricted the hospitals' ability to lower charges for the unin-
sured and underinsured, and to forgive their debts.' 45 The AHA argued
that Medicare billing rules require a uniform charge structure for all pa-
tients. 146 Although there are exceptions to the uniform charge rule to
allow hospitals to discount charges to needy Medicare beneficiaries, the
AHA argued that fulfilling the requirements to qualify for the exceptions
is onerous and uncertain. 147 The hospitals must either assume "considera-
ble administrative burdens" and obtain prior approval from CMS agents or
make detailed and verified financial findings to support their identifica-
tion of Medicare beneficiaries as indigent. 1 48 Further, in order to receive
payments from Medicare for cost sharing amounts that hospitals have
been unable to collect from Medicare beneficiaries, the hospitals must en-
gage in "reasonable collection efforts" which are uniform for all pa-
tients. 149 The "reasonable collection efforts" required by Medicare have
come to be defined through Medicare audits as rather aggressive collec-
tions practices. 150 The ALA also noted that CMS and the OIG had vigor-
ously enforced the Medicare bad debt rules, subjecting hospitals to
141. See id. at 16, 19 (statement of Gerard F. Anderson, Director, Johns Hop-
kins Center for Hospital, Finance and Management) (opining reasons for exces-
sive charges).
142. See id. at 98 (statement of Herbert Pardes, President and CEO of New
York Presbyterian Hospital) (explaining that New York Presbyterian Hospital
writes off $70 million in bad debt each year).
143. See id. at 92 (statement ofJack 0. Bovender, Jr., Chairman and CEO, the
Hospital Corporation of America).
144. See id. at 240-53 (presenting document submitted by AlA, setting forth
various hospital defenses to alleged inappropriate billing and collections
practices).
145. See id. (providing AHA's primary defense offered to support hospitals'
alleged inappropriate billing and collections practices against uninsured patients).
146. See id. at 241 (presenting AHA's defense that Medicare does not permit
hospitals to lower charges for uninsured).
147. See id. at 245-46 (detailing difficulties in complying with exceptions to
uniform charge requirement).
148. See id. (noting tasks required to be performed by hospitals to utilize uni-
form patient charge exception).
149. See id. at 246 (discussing Medicare debt collection rules).
150. See id. at 241-42 (stating that Medicare reviews and audits have shaped
definition of reasonable collection efforts).
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expensive and time consuming audit appeals whenever Medicare chal-
lenged the hospitals' lack of sufficient substantiation of indigence or insuf-
ficient collection efforts. 15' In addition, the AHA stated that the federal
anti-kickback law' 52 and a Fraud Alert issued by the OIG warning hospitals
about routinely waiving Medicare deductibles and copayments 153 chilled
hospitals' willingness to discount charges or forgive debt for Medicare
beneficiaries.1 5 4 Therefore, the AHA concluded that the Medicare rules,
albeit "inadvertently," had discouraged hospitals from creating across-the-
board exemptions for uninsured or underinsured patients and from being
more lenient in collections.
155
In response, the OIG flatly denied any basis to contend that the Medi-
care rules or fraud and abuse laws prohibited hospitals from offering dis-
counts to the uninsured and underinsured. 15 6 With regard to the
uninsured, the OIG stated:
Frankly, we do not know why lawyers advising hospitals would tell
them that the fraud and abuse laws are an impediment to dis-
counts to the uninsured. Such discounts do not violate the fraud




CMS also asserted that while Medicare reimbursement could be affected
by hospitals' charge levels, charges are currently utilized as a basis for
Medicare payment only in very limited circumstances.158 Moreover, debts
could be forgiven for Medicare beneficiaries as long as the hospitals com-
151. See id. at 246-50.
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2000) (prohibiting remuneration to hospitals
for referrals for services under federal health care program). The federal anti-
kickback law states:
Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration (in-
cluding any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or
covertly, in cash or in kind-
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnish-
ing or arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which
payment may be made in whole or in part under a Federal health
care program.
Id.
153. See OIG Special Fraud Alerts, 59 Fed. Reg. 65,372, 65,375 (Dec. 19, 1994)
(discussing waiver of Medicare copayments).
154. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 251-52 (stating that anti-kickback laws incen-
tivized hospitals to aggressively seek payment from uninsured).
155. See id. at 240-41 (asserting that Medicare regulations prohibited hospitals
from offering more lenient billing and collections procedures for uninsured).
156. See id. at 136 (statement of Lewis Morris, Chief Counsel, Office of Inspec-
tor General, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services).
157. Id.
158. See id. at 133-34 (statement of Herb Kuhn, Director, Center for Medicare
Management, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services) (stating that most providers are currently reimbursed
under "prospective payment" methodology where charges are not considered).
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plied with the anti-kickback waiver requirements, which require only that
the waivers not be advertised or routinely given and that the hospital make
a case-by-case finding of need.
159
As of the date of this writing, the congressional probe into hospitals'
charity care practices is continuing.1 60 In April 2005, the House Energy
and Commerce Committee sent additional requests for information to ten
159. See id. at 135-36 (referring, apparently, to civil monetary penalty statute,
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (2000), which authorizes CMS to impose civil monetary pen-
alties for Medicare fraud, but which excepts any waivers of coinsurance and de-
ductible amounts that are unadvertised, non-routine and pursuant to
individualized determination of financial need or after failure of reasonable collec-
tion efforts).
160. See Witnesses Tell Senate Finance Committee Nonprofit Health Care Needs More
Oversight, 14 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 493, 493 (2005) (reporting on Finance Com-
mittee's April 2005 hearing on charitable tax exemptions for hospitals). The re-
cent congressional hearing before the Senate Finance Committee addressed the
need for greater oversight of charitable healthcare organizations as part of a pro-
posed nonprofit taxation reform. See id. (reporting that witnesses testified that any
nonprofit taxation reform legislation should provide for greater oversight of chari-
table healthcare organizations). The Commissioner of Internal Revenue testified
that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) needs more flexibility to penalize charita-
ble abuses and specifically noted that charitable healthcare entities may not sacri-
fice their charitable purposes for the sake of profit. See id. (stating that Mark
Everson, IRS Commissioner, argued that IRS needs more resources to address
nonprofit tax exemption issues). The IRS has reportedly sent letters to approxi-
mately 2000 nonprofit organizations (including healthcare organizations) asking
the nonprofits to demonstrate that they are in compliance with IRS guidelines for
establishing reasonable compensation for their executives and board members.
See Nonprofit Health Care Entities Gear up to Respond to IRS Compensation Audits, 14
Health L. Rep. (BNA) 629, 629 (2005) (discussing problems nonprofit healthcare
organizations may encounter in responding to audit letters). On May 25, 2005,
the Senate Finance Committee sent letters to ten hospital systems asking for infor-
mation about charitable activities, patient billing and ventures with for-profit enti-
ties, seeking to discover whether "the benefits [the hospitals] provide to the needy
justify the tax breaks they receive." See Press Release, Senate Fin. Comm., Grassley
Asks Non-Profit Hospitals to Account for Activities Related to Their Tax-exempt
Status (May 25, 2005), available at http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2005/
prg052505.pdf (including text of letter).
In May 2005, the House Ways and Means Committee held hearings to ex-
amine whether tax-exempt hospitals should be subjected to improved congres-
sional oversight and increased IRS enforcement. See generally A Review of the Tax-
Exempt Hospital Sector: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th
Cong. 1-8 (May 26, 2005), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.
asp?formmode=view&id-3193 (presenting testimony regarding oversight of tax ex-
emption requirements for hospitals). The stated goal of the hearing was to ex-
amine "what is the taxpayer getting in return for the tens of billions of dollars per
year in tax subsidy." See id. at 3. The Committee considered a recently released
General Accounting Office (GAO) study which had found that "current tax policy
lacks specific criteria with respect to tax exemptions for charitable entities and
detail on how that tax exemption is conferred." See id. at 7-8 (citing recent GAO
study).
According to a work plan released by the IRS on October 26, 2005, the IRS
will continue to focus on whether tax-exempt hospitals are furnishing sufficient
community benefits to warrant their exemption. The IRS intends to send compli-
ance check letters to hospitals on this and related matters in 2006. See IRS Predicts
2006]
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leading hospitals, this time seeking explanations of how hospital charges
are "presented, explained, and understood by the medical consumer"1 6 '
and "how patients ... are affected by ... high prices for services."' 6
2
VII. AN EVALUATION OF THE HOSPITALS' AND HHS' POSITIONS
While there is no question that many hospitals have not acted charita-
bly with regard to uninsured patients,1 63 it also appears that, contrary to
the denials by HHS, 164 hospitals had legitimate reasons for believing that
lowering charges for the uninsured and underinsured or failing to take
aggressive collections activities would expose themselves to regulatory risk.
CMS's and the OIG's Advisory Opinions, Bulletins, Fraud Alerts, audit
findings and even their express statements at the congressional hearing
support the hospitals' position that waiving cost sharing or forgiving debt
created regulatory risk. Although the hospitals' defenses with regard to
the uninsured are substantially weaker than their defenses regarding
Medicare beneficiaries, there are some legitimate bases supporting the
hospitals' reluctance to discount charges or forgive debt.
There is substantial evidence that with regard to indigent Medicare
beneficiaries, cost sharing waivers can create exposure under the federal
fraud and abuse laws. On December 19, 1994, the OIG published a Fraud
Alert warning that the routine waiver of copayments or deductibles under
Focus on Nonprofit Hospitals in Letter, Initiatives Plan Issued for FY 2006, 14 Health L.
Rep. (BNA) 1413, 1413 (2005).
161. See House Committee Seeks More Data on Hospital Charges, Billing Clarity, 14
Health L. Rep. (BNA) 579, 580 (2005) (presenting letter written by House Energy
and Commerce Committee to hospitals, which explains that committee is "examin-
ing how clear, accurate, and accessible these important [bills and explanations of
charges] are to patients"); see also Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives,
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Comm. Expands Inquiry into Hosp. Billing Sys.
(Apr. 26, 2005), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/News/
04262005_1504.htm [hereinafter Press Release, Committee Expands Inquiry] (dis-
cussing House Energy and Commerce Committee's review of "overly complex"
hospital bills).
162. See House Committee Seeks More Data on Hospital Charges, Billing Clarity,
supra note 161, at 580. The letter to the hospitals stated that the Committee was
looking at balance billing for out-of-network patients (patients who receive treat-
ments at hospitals that have not negotiated discounts with the patients' insurance
plans) and rates for property/casualty insurers, which "may be paying medical ben-
efits under their policies at or close to the full charge master rates." See Press
Release, Committee Expands Inquiry, supra note 161 (providing text of letter sent
to hospitals).
163. For a discussion of news articles and research findings reporting that
hospitals did not advise uninsured patients of charity care that was available to
them, did not negotiate reduced charges or reasonable payment plans, charged
unreasonably high interest and took extremely aggressive collections actions, such
as foreclosure of the patients' residences or body attachments, see supra notes 23-
98 and accompanying text.
164. For a discussion of the denials by Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), see supra notes 138-59 and accompanying text.
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Medicare Part B exposed a provider to anti-kickback risk.165 The OIG
stressed that while cost sharing amounts could be forgiven where the pro-
vider makes a determination of the beneficiary's financial hardship, such
forgiveness was to be an exception used only occasionally.1 6 6 As recently
as August 2002, the OIG was still sending much the same message. 167 In a
Special Advisory Bulletin, the OIG warned against "Offering Gifts and
Other Inducements to Beneficiaries." 168 Therein, the OIG declared the
same general rule that giving free services typically violates Medicare
rules. 16 9 Further, the OIG announced that anti-kickback exposure existed
when a provider gave free services to Medicare beneficiaries based on a
broad category of financial need as opposed to a case-by-case finding of
indigence. 1
70
165. See OIG Special Fraud Alerts, 59 Fed. Reg. 65,372, 65,375 (Dec. 19,
1994). While Medicare Part B generally refers to physician services, the OIG noted
that the Fraud Alert was not intended to legitimize Part A (hospital) waivers:
This fraud alert is not intended to address the routine waiver of copay-
ments and deductibles by providers, practitioners or suppliers who are
paid on the basis of costs or diagnostic related groups. [Inpatient hospi-
tal services are generally reimbursed by Medicare under a diagnostic re-
lated group (DRG) methodology.] The fact that these types of services
are not discussed in this fraud alert should not be interpreted to legiti-
mize routine waiver of deductibles and copayments with respect to these
payment methods.
Id. at 65,374 (noting that fraud alert is not intended to address hospital waivers).
In fact, Advisory Opinions issued by the OIG have indicated that the OIG is con-
cerned about hospitals' routine waivers of cost sharing for program beneficiaries.
See, e.g., 01-7 Op. DHHS-OIG (2001) (addressing OIG concern about routine fee
waivers by hospitals).
166. See OIG Special Fraud Alerts, 59 Fed. Reg. at 65,375 ("This hardship ex-
ception, however, must not be used routinely; it should be used occasionally to
address the special financial needs of a particular patient .... Except in such spe-
cial cases, a good faith effort to collect deductibles and copayments must be
made.").
167. OFFCE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTh AND HUMAN SERVICES,
SPECIAL ADvIsORY BULL., OFFERING GIFTS AND OTHER INDUCEMENTS TO BENEFI-
CIARIEs 5 (2002), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/
SABGiftsandlnducements.pdf (stating limits on waivers of fees for financial need).
168. Id. at 1.
169. See id. at 2 (stating that "unless a provider's practices fit within an excep-
tion (as implemented by regulations) or are the subject of a favorable advisory
opinion covering a provider's own activity, any gifts or free services to [Medicare or
Medicaid] beneficiaries should not exceed the $10 per item and $50 annual
limits").
170. See id. at 5. The OIG stated that:
[T] here is no meaningful statutory basis for a broad exemption based on
the financial need of a category of patients. The statute specifically ap-
plies the prohibition to the Medicaid program-a program that is availa-
ble only to financially needy persons. The inclusion of Medicaid within
the prohibition demonstrates Congress' conclusion that categorical fi-
nancial need is not a sufficient basis for permitting valuable gifts. This
conclusion is supported by the statute's specific exception for non-rou-
tine waivers of copayments and deductibles based on individual financial
need. If Congress intended a broad exception for financially needy per-
20061
25
Cohen: The Controversy over Hospital Charges to the Uninsured - No Villa
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
A number of Advisory Opinions issued by the OIG confirm that waiv-
ers of coinsurance or deductibles for Medicare beneficiaries can be prob-
lematic unless based upon a documented individualized determination of
need. 17 1 Although the OIG has issued a number of Advisory Opinions
declining to impose sanctions for free services or waiving cost sharing
amounts to Medicare beneficiaries, the OIG has made it clear that these
cases are unique. For example, waivers have been approved where they
were offered to encourage patients to obtain preventive services that they
might not otherwise opt to receive, 172 to encourage patients to participate
in clinical trials that could lead to important scientific findings17 3 and to
fulfill a provider's nationally recognized charitable mission.
174
sons, it is unlikely that it would have expressly included the Medicaid pro-
gram within the prohibition and then created such a narrow exception.
Id.
171. See, e.g., Op. Off. Inspector Gen. No. 02-7, slip op. at 1 (June 12, 2002),
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2002/aoO207.pdf (stating that
waiver of coinsurance for portable x-ray services provided to nursing home re-
sidents could violate anti-kickback statute and be grounds for sanctions under So-
cial Security Act as waivers were not based on financial need, but on administrative
burdens sought to be avoided by nursing homes); Op. Off. Inspector Gen. No. 97-
4, slip op. at I (Sept. 25, 1997), http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/
1997/97_4.pdf (advising ambulatory surgical center that declining to pursue col-
lection of copayments from patients with employer-sponsored Medicare supple-
mental coverage may constitute grounds for sanctions under fraud provisions of
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, anti-kickback statute and So-
cial Security Act, as waivers were not based on individualized determination of
financial need and were intended to induce beneficiaries to obtain services at am-
bulatory surgery center).
172. See, e.g., Op. Off. Inspector Gen. No. 01-14, slip op. at 2 (Sept. 4, 2001),
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2001/aoO-1 4.pdf (stating that
no sanctions would be imposed regarding hospital's waiver of copayments and de-
ductibles for screening services to promote early detection of breast and gyneco-
logical cancers).
173. See, e.g., Op. Off. Inspector Gen. No. 04-01, slip op. at 2 (Feb. 9, 2004),
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2004/aoO401G.pdf (stating that
waiver of cost sharing amounts for blood glucose equipment and supplies used by
Medicare beneficiaries participating in diabetes investigation clinical trial would
not constitute grounds for imposition of sanctions); Op. Off. Inspector Gen. No.
02-16, slip op. at 2 (Jan. 3, 2003), http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopi-
nions/2002/ao0216a.pdf (finding that waiver of cost sharing amounts for blood
glucose equipment and supplies used by Medicare beneficiaries participating in
clinical trial for cardiovascular risks would not constitute grounds for imposition of
sanctions); Op. Off. Inspector Gen. No. 00-5, slip. op. at 2 (July 7, 2000), http://
oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2000/ao00_5.htm (finding that waiver
of cost sharing amounts to participants in clinical study of emphysema would not
result in sanctions); Op. Off. Inspector Gen. No. 98-6, slip op. at 2 (May 1, 1998),
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/1998/ao986.pdf (finding that
waiving coinsurance amounts for participants in clinical trial for emphysema treat-
ment would not result in sanctions).
174. See, e.g., Op. Off. Inspector Gen. No. 01-7, slip op. at 6 (July 3, 2001),
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2001/aoOl-07.pdf (stating that
tuberculosis sanatorium's application of "Insurance Only Billing Policy" is "singu-
lar vestige of Hospital['s] charitable origin and continuing mission"); Op. Off. In-
spector Gen. No. 99-7, slip op. at 2 (July 9, 1999), http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/
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Statements made by CMS and the OIG at the congressional hearing
further confirm that routine waivers for Medicare beneficiaries are prohib-
ited. When asked by the Subcommittee whether setting an indigence
threshold at a given percentage of the federal poverty level 175 would vio-
late the Medicare rules, 176 CMS responded that there could be a problem
if the level selected amounted to a waiver of coinsurance in every case.
177
When asked to confirm that a hospital's posting of its charity care policy
on its web site or including its charity care policy on its bills would not
violate Medicare rules, once again, the 0IG declined to give a clear "yes"
answer. The OIG responded that "one of the elements [of meeting the
anti-kickback safe harbor] is not advertising the promotion of those rou-
tine waivers."
1 78
Even when hospitals presumably seek to fulfill Medicare's require-
ments for individualized assessments of need and reasonable collection
efforts prior to waiving cost sharing or forgiving debt for Medicare benefi-
ciaries, Medicare audits show that Medicare often challenges hospitals'
claims for bad debt reimbursement on the grounds that the indigence
findings were not sufficiently documented 179 or that the collection efforts
advisoryopinions/1999/ao99_7.htm (stating that National Eye Care Project's
waiver of copayments is "key component" of medical services covered by project);
Op. Off. Inspector Gen. No. 99-6, slip op. at 2 (Apr. 14,1999), http://oig.hhs.gov/
fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/1999/ao99_6.htm (finding that St. Jude Children's
Research Hospital's policy of not billing pediatric oncology patients for coinsur-
ance and deductibles would not be subject to sanctions).
175. See Lagnado, Full Price, supra note 33 (stating that federal poverty level in
2004 was $8980 year for individual and $18,400 for family of four).
176. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 147 (statement of Rep. James C. Greenwood,
Member, H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Chairman, Subcomm. on Over-
sight and Investigations) (asking CMS whether setting charity care policy that trig-
gered at 500, 700 or 800% of federal poverty level would trigger regulatory
concern).
177. See id. (statement of Herb Kuhn, Director, Center for Medicare Manage-
ment, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services) (stating that setting income level too high to consistently
waive deductible would be problem).
178. See id. at 146 (statement of Lewis Morris, Chief Counsel, Office of Inspec-
tor General, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services). The OIG stated
that public service announcements and fliers would be permissible, but that "peo-
ple should not be encouraged to seek medical care where they are told there is no
out-of-pocket, and it is being put on the side of buses." Id.
179. See, e.g., OFFICE OF AUDIT SERVICES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, AUDIT OF INPATIENT BAD DEBTS CLAIMED BY MEMORIAL HERMANN Hospi-
TAL IN ITS MEDICARE COST REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2000, Au-
DIT No. A-06-02-0027, at 4-7 (2002), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/
region6/60200027.pdf (concluding that hospital did not meet reimbursement re-
quirements for certain claims due to failure to document indigence findings); OF-
FICE OF AUDIT SERVICES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REVIEW OF
MEDICARE DEBTS FORJACKSON MEMORIAL FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30,
1999, AUDIT No. A-04-02-02015, at 4-9 (2002), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oas/
reports/region4/40202015.pdf (same); see also Hoag Mem'l Hosp. Presbyterian v.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass'n/United Gov't Servs., LLC, No. 2002-D28, 2002
WL 31548714, at *3 (P.R.R.B. Aug. 2, 2002) (denying reimbursement for certain
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were not sufficiently rigorous.180 Moreover, the audits illustrate that when
hospitals' claims for bad debt reimbursement are challenged by Medicare,
substantial reimbursement amounts may be withheld1 8 1 for a significant
period of time pending appeal. 182 Therefore, these audits justifiably rein-
bad debts due in part to hospital's failure to provide evidence of determination of
indigent status); Peachtree Rehab. Ctr. v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., No. 99-D9, 1998
WL 870204, at *7 (P.R.R.B. Nov. 24, 1998) (same).
Recently, in announcing Compliance Program Guidance for hospitals, the
OIG confirmed that the documentation required for claiming reimbursement for
Medicare bad debt is substantial:
A hospital should examine a patient's total resources, which could in-
clude, but are not limited to, an analysis of assets, liabilities, income, ex-
penses, and any extenuating circumstances that would affect the
determination. The hospital should document the method by which it
determined the indigency and include all backup information used to
substantiate the determination. If, instead of making such a determina-
tion, a hospital attempts to collect the outstanding amounts from the
Medicare beneficiary, such efforts must be documented in the patient's
file with copies of the bill(s), follow-up letters, and reports of telephone
and personal contacts. In the case of a dually-eligible patient (i.e., a pa-
tient entitled to both Medicare and Medicaid), the hospital should docu-
ment the bad debt claim by including a denial of payment from the State.
Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 70 Fed. Reg. 4858 (Jan. 31, 2005).
In guidance issued on February 2, 2004, the OIG further stated that hospitals
"should recheck a patient's eligibility at reasonable intervals sufficient to ensure
that the patient remains in financial need." See OFFcE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, BULL., HOSPITAL DISCOUNTS OFFERED TO
PATIENTS WHO CANNOT AFFORD TO PAY THEIR HOSPITAL BILLS 4 (2004) [hereinafter
OFFERED DISCOUNTS], available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsandbulle-
tins/2004/FA021904hospitaldiscounts.pdf.
180. See, e.g., Metro Physical Therapy & Rehab., Inc. v. Blue Cross and Blue
Shield Ass'n/United Gov't Servs., LLC, No. 2002-D35, 2002 WL 31005907, at *4
(P.R.R.B. Aug. 28, 2002) (finding that provider sent working patients' accounts to
collection agency, but that non-working patients' accounts, presumed to be mostly
Medicare, were written off as bad debt without being sent to collection agency);
OFFICE OF AUDIT SERVICES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REVIEW OF
MEDICARE DEBTS FOR FLORIDA HOSPITAL FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31,
1999, AUDIT No. A-04-02-02011, at 4-6 (2002), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oas/
reports/region4/40202011.pdf (finding that hospital used more collection efforts
for its non-Medicare patients than it did for Medicare patients); see also AHA, FED-
ERAL REGULATIONS HAMPER HOSPITALS' EFFORTS TO ASSIST PATIENTS OF LIMITED
MEANS 2-3 (2003) [hereinafter REGULATIONS HAMPER HOSPITALS], available at
http://www.caringforcommunities.org/caringforcommunities/content/031217
fedregs.pdf (stating that OIG reviews and audits have "created an expectation that
hospitals must be aggressive in their collection efforts or risk losing Medicare reim-
bursement for bad debt").
181. See, e.g., OFFICE OF AUDIT SERVICES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, AUDIT OF INPATIENT BAD DEBTS CLAIMED BY MEMORIAL HERMANN HOSPI-
TAL IN ITS MEDICARE COST REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2000, AUDIT
No. A-06-02-0027, at 7 (2002), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/re-
gion6/60200027.pdf (reviewing finding by OIG that hospital's bad debt claim was
overstated by $919,331).
182. See, e.g., Hoag Mem'l Hosp. Presbyterian, 2002 WL 31548714, at *3 (noting
review decision issued August 2, 2002 relating to period ending September 11,
1993); Peachtree Rehab. Ctr., 1998 WL 870204, at *7 (noting review decision issued
November 24, 1998 relating to period ending December 31, 1991).
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forced hospitals' perceptions that the safest route from a Medicare reim-
bursement perspective was to reduce charges or forgive debt for Medicare
beneficiaries only in rare instances or not at all, and to undertake vigorous
collection activities for all Medicare patients.
1 83
The hospitals' argument that Medicare rules and fraud and abuse
laws prohibited them from discounting charges to the uninsured is consid-
erably weaker than its defenses with regard to Medicare beneficiaries, as
there are no direct statutory or regulatory prohibitions on waiver for unin-
sured patients. The Medicare billing rules and federal anti-kickback law
do not apply directly to this class of patients because they are not covered
by Medicare or any other federal healthcare program.1
8 4
Nevertheless, there were still some bases for hospitals to have been
legitimately concerned over discounting charges to the uninsured. The
hospitals' best defense is Medicare's "uniform charge rule," which requires
hospitals to set uniform charges for all patients185 to ensure that costs of
treating non-Medicare patients are not being shifted to the Medicare pro-
gram. 18 6 As the OIG noted at the congressional hearing, it is authorized
to exclude from Medicare participation any provider that charges Medi-
care more than it charges other patients for the same service. 1 87 The AHA
183. See REGuLATIONS HAMPER HosPrrALs, supra note 180, at 10-11 (explaining
that Medicare audit procedures further pushed hospitals to bill uninsured patients
in full and aggressively collect debts owed). The AHA asserted:
The length and the complexity of the appeals process for disallowed pay-
ments further deter hospitals from curtailing collection efforts from low-
income patients .... [In one instance], [t]he hospital had to fight the
issue administratively and in federal court for more than 10 years to re-
ceive definitive guidance on the question from a federal appeals court.
Thus, when the Medicare policies on bad debts are unclear, it takes years
to settle the disputes, at substantial cost and with substantial sums of
Medicare reimbursement at stake .... The effect of the entire regulatory
scheme is to pressure hospitals in these circumstances to be conservative
in following the standard collection agency course, rather than negotiate
a lower payment amount.
Id.
184. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1) (2000) (restricting applicability of anti-
kickback law to payments made under "federal healthcare program"). Obviously,
the Medicare billing rules are applicable only to Medicare members.
185. See REGULATIONS HAMPER HOSPITALS, supra note 180, at 4 (examining
Section 2203 of the Medicare Provider Reimbursement Manual, which states, in
relevant part, that "[s] o that its charges may be allowable for use in apportioning
costs under the program, each facility should have an established charge structure
which is applied uniformly to each patient as services are furnished to the patient").
186. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 19 (statement of Gerard F. Anderson, Direc-
tor, Johns Hopkins Center for Hospital, Finance and Management) ("In order to
prevent fraud and abuse, the Medicare program required hospitals to establish a
uniform set of charges that would apply to everyone .... Otherwise the hospitals
could allocate charges in such a way that would result in more costs to the Medi-
care program.").
187. See id. at 137 (statement of Lewis Morris, Chief Counsel, Office of Inspec-
tor General, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) ("The antikickback
statute and permissive exclusion authority [prohibit] suppliers from charging
20061
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stated that this was a justifiable basis for hospitals to resist discounting
charges to the uninsured. 1
8 8
The OIG attempted to dispel the hospitals' concern over the uniform
charge rule, however, by pointing out that it has proposed regulations
clarifying that reduced charges offered to uninsured patients will not be
considered as the hospital's usual charges for purposes of the OIG's exclu-
sionary authority.1 8 9 Nevertheless, as the OIG itself conceded, these regu-
lations are still in proposed form, not finalized. 190 Moreover, this
declared change in Medicare reimbursement policy is relatively recent,
having appeared in the Federal Register on September 15, 2003.191
Medicare and Medicaid substantially more than they usually charge other custom-
ers."). The OIG is statutorily authorized to exclude from participation in Medicare
and Medicaid any individual who: "has submitted or caused to be submitted bills
or requests for payment [under Medicare] or a State health care program ...
containing charges . . .for items or services furnished substantially in excess of
such individual's or entity's usual charges ...." See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b) (6) (A)
(2000) (stating grounds for exclusion). The implementing regulations restate that
the OIG may exclude an individual or entity that has "[s]ubmitted, or caused to be
submitted, bills or requests for payments under Medicare or any of the State health
care programs containing charges or costs for items or services furnished that are
substantially in excess of such individual's or entity's usual charges or costs for
such items or services . . . ." See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.701(a)(1) (2004) (authorizing
exclusion of individuals from Medicare and Medicaid where reimbursement re-
quests exceed usual charges). The OIG explained at the congressional hearing
that "[t] his law is intended to protect the Medicare and Medicaid programs-and
the taxpayers-from providers and suppliers that routinely charge the Medicare or
Medicaid programs substantially more than they usually charge other customers."
See Hearing, supra note 1, at 137 (statement of Lewis Morris, Chief Counsel, Office
of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services).
188. See REGULATIONS HAMPER HOSPITAIS, supra note 180, at 4 ("The practical
result of CMS's insistence on uniform charges is that hospitals have been discour-
aged from lowering their charges to patients of limited means."); see also PRYOR,
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES, supra note 79, at 6 (reporting that Medicare carriers
manual states that routinely waiving fees constitutes reduction in provider's usual
and customary charges, so that Medicare may reduce reimbursement for Medicare
patients by amount of waived fees). When questioned at an Open Door Forum on
June 1, 2004, whether the indigency criteria for Medicare patients must be applied
to non-Medicare patients, CMS staffers provided very little clarification, respond-
ing that "differences in the criteria for Medicare and non-Medicare patients would
be permitted so long as the threshold requirements are 'similar.'" See AHA, CMS/
OIG OPEN DOOR FORUM ON HOSPITAL BILLING AND COLLECTIONS, A SUMMARY 1
(2004), available at http://www.caringforcommunities.org/caringforcommunities/
content/040601 opendoor.pdf.
189. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 137 (statement of Lewis Morris, Chief Coun-
sel, Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services)
(stating that OIG proposed regulations "clarify that free or substantially reduced
prices offered to uninsured do not need to be factored into a hospital's usual
charges for purposes of the exclusion authority").
190. See id.
191. See Medicare and Federal Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Clari-
fication of Terms and Application of Program Exclusion Authority for Submitting
Claims Containing Excessive Charges, 68 Fed. Reg. 53,939, 53,941 (proposed Sept.
15, 2003) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001) (noting proposed rule to amend
OIG exclusionary authority). The OIG confirmed by guidance issued in February
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Further, despite the OIG's efforts to ameliorate concerns over the
uniform charge rule, the OIG has never stated that a hospital's "usual
charges" can be amounts that, in fact, are never billed to any patients or
perhaps only to a few patients. 1 92 This leaves open the question of how
extensively hospitals can waive and discount their charges to the unin-
sured while still maintaining that they have master charges against which
their Medicare rates can be measured for purposes of compliance with the
uniform charge rule.
In addition, CMS and the OIG failed to address the hospitals' legiti-
mate dilemma regarding how discounting charges to the uninsured might
impact the hospitals' use of charges as the benchmark for negotiating
third-party rates. As stated at the congressional hearing by the CEO of the
Hospital Corporation of America (HCA):
The more complicated problem is that many of our contracts-
and at HCA we have over 5,000 contracts with managed care
providers across the country. Many of those contracts are not on
a per diem basis or case rate basis, but are really based on a dis-
count off of charges.... It will take us probably two to two and a
half years to renegotiate all of those contracts because many of
them are multiple year contracts. 193
As a result, any lowering of charges to benefit the uninsured could have
unintended and drastic consequences to the reimbursements collected by
the hospitals under their third-party contracts. 19 4 While rates with third-
party payors could be renegotiated to address this contingency in the fu-
ture, multi-year term third-party contracts might presently bar hospitals
from tampering with their charge schedules. 19 5
2004 that it would not consider free or reduced charges to uninsured or underin-
sured patients when calculating usual charges for purposes of its exclusionary au-
thority. See OFFERED DiscouNTs, supra note 179, at 1 (presenting decision not to
consider free or reduced charges to uninsured or underinsured persons when cal-
culating Medicare reimbursement).
192. Even if a hospital discounted charges for all uninsured patients, it could
still bill full charges to non-indigent international visitors who come to the United
States for healthcare. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 16 (statement of Gerard F. An-
derson, Director, Johns Hopkins Center for Hospital, Finance and Management)
(stating that these international visitors are "typically affluent individuals who need
a procedure that can be performed most effectively in the United States").
193. Id. at 114 (statement of Jack 0. Bovender, Jr., Chairman and CEO, the
Hospital Corporation of America).
194. See Lagnado, Full Price, supra note 33 (providing that "[t]he elaborate
pricing systems hospitals have developed over the years will be difficult to
change"). The article further stated: "'The entire system will have to be blown up
[if charges are discounted for the uninsured].'" Id. (quotingJan Emerson, spokes-
woman for California Healthcare Association).
195. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 114 (statement of Jack 0. Bovender, Jr.,
Chairman and CEO, the Hospital Corporation of America) ("It will take us proba-
bly two to two and a half years to renegotiate all of those [managed care] contracts
because many of them are multiple year contracts."); see also PRYOR, UNINTENDED
2006]
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Hospitals also legitimately argued that the "uniform collections rule"
served as an impediment to across-the-board free or discounted care for
the uninsured. The uniform collections rule requires providers to use
similar efforts to collect debts from Medicare beneficiaries as from non-
Medicare patients. 196 CMS and the OIG confirmed at the congressional
hearing that "[i]f a hospital wants Medicare bad debt reimbursement, it
must at the very least send non-indigent Medicare patients a bill for the
debt, and must make some reasonable effort to collect from Medicare pa-
tients as it does from non-Medicare patients."197 CMS has made similar state-
ments in opinion letters.' 98 These statements justifiably signaled to the
hospitals that they must undertake the same vigorous collections efforts
for all patients, including the uninsured, or risk losing Medicare bad debt
reimbursement. 199
Finally, there are still some explicit link-ups between hospitals' unin-
sured billing practices and Medicare billing rules. CMS conceded at the
congressional hearing that for at least a limited group of providers subject
CONSEQUENCES, supra note 79, at 10 ("Many managed care contracts also stipulate
that the provider must charge the 'usual' fee for services rendered to members.").
196. See REGULATIONS HAMPER HosprTms, supra note 180, at 4 (discussing
Medicare collections requirement). The uniform collections rule has been recog-
nized by the federal courts. See Mt. Sinai Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 196 F.3d 703,
706 (7th Cir. 1999) ("Section 310 of the Provider Reimbursement Manual provides
that: 'To be considered a reasonable collection effort, a provider's effort to collect
Medicare deductible and coinsurance amounts must be similar to the effort pro-
vider puts forth to collect comparable amounts from non-Medicare patients.'").
197. Hearing, supra note 1, at 145 (statement of Herb Kuhn, Director, Center
for Medicare Management, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services) (emphasis added). A CMS representa-
tive also stated at the congressional hearing that "if the hospital wants to bill the
Medicare program for bad debt related to unpaid deductibles and co-insurance by
Medicare beneficiaries, it must use the same level of collection activity to secure
collection of those debts by Medicare patients as it does to secure collection of
debts by non-Medicare patients." See id. at 131-32 (providing that "[e]fforts to col-
lect from non-Medicare patients must be similar to the efforts to collect from
Medicare patients").
198. See, e.g., REGULATIONS HAMPER HOSPITALS, supra note 180, at 8 (sug-
gesting that "[w] here a provider expends less effort to collect from some patients
than from others. . . it has an inconsistent collection effort contrary to Medicare
policy" (quoting Letter from Laurence D. Wilson, Director Chronic Care Policy
Group, CMS, to Mark Rukavina (Sept. 11, 2003) (on file with author))).
199. The hospitals' argument that the uniform collections rule compelled
collections of uninsured debt is not completely logical, however. Presumably, the
rule was adopted by Medicare to preserve Medicare funds, by preventing hospitals
from collecting bad debt reimbursement from the program without first making
the same reasonable collections efforts for Medicare patients that the hospitals
used for non-Medicare patients. Here, however, the issue was whether the hospi-
tals could forego collections from uninsured patients, resulting in their using more
stringent, not more lax, debt collection practices for Medicare beneficiaries. For-
giving debt for the uninsured would not cause hospitals to abandon reasonable
collections for Medicare members, so that doing so, at least in principle, would not
appear to offend the uniform collections rule.
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to the "lesser of cost-or-charges" reimbursement principle2 °0 (whereby
Medicare reimbursement is based upon the lesser of the provider's cost or
charge level) 20 1 reducing charges, even if just for the uninsured, could
decrease the hospital's reimbursement from Medicare. 20 2 In new gui-
dance issued in February 2004, the OIG noted that charges reported for
purposes of setting a hospital's cost-to-charge ratio are still "used to set
reimbursement in certain areas of the Medicare program, such as some
features of the outpatient prospective payment system." 20 3 And as noted
by the AHA, Medicare's entire conversion to a case based system has been
relatively recent, with the program's discontinuance of cost-based outpa-
tient payments having occurred only three years prior to the congressional
hearing.20 4 Accordingly, hospitals' rate structures and discounting poli-
cies understandably may still reflect older charge-based methods of deter-
mining reimbursement.
VIII. INITIAL RULINGS ON THE FEDERAL CLAIMS IN THE
CHARITY CARE CLASS ACTIONS
The early decisions rendered by the district courts in the class actions
challenging hospitals' billing and collections practices have been almost
unanimously in favor of the hospitals. First, a serious early blow to the
class action plaintiffs occurred when the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
200. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 134 (statement of Herb Kuhn, Director,
Center for Medicare Management, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) ("Few providers are subject to
the [lesser of cost or charges] principle at all .... The only example I am aware of
is a pediatric or cancer hospital in its first year of operation .... ").
201. See id. at 133 (providing that "where the LCC [lesser of cost or charges]
principle is applicable, a Medicare provider is paid the lesser of its actual costs or its
actual charges").
202. See id. (noting hospitals' potential loss of Medicare reimbursement after
reducing charges to uninsured). Kuhn continues:
Implementing a reduced charge program for uninsured patients could
potentially trigger the LCC [lesser of cost or charges] principle because if
a hospital lowered charges for enough patients, a hospital's fiscal inter-
mediary could take the position that a hospital's charges were not its
posted, or stated, charges, but rather, the charges applicable to most of its
patients who were receiving discounted services. If the FI [fiscal interme-
diary] did take that position, it could then invoke the LCC principle and
pay the hospital that lower charge-based amount.
Id.
203. See Ctr. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Services, Questions on Charges for the Uninsured, http://www.cms.gov/
FAQUninsured.pdf (last visitedJan. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Questions on Charges
for the Uninsured] (stating that hospitals must continue to report charges on an-
nual cost reports for certain reimbursements under Medicare).
204. See REGULATIONS HAMPER HOSPITALS, supra note 180, at 6-7.
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Litigation refused to centralize 20 5 the federal class actions. 20 6 The theory
supporting centralization was that the lawsuits all challenged the same
types of billing and collections practices by the hospitals.20 7 The panel
denied centralization, however, ruling that it would neither serve the con-
venience of the parties and witnesses nor further the just and efficient
conduct of the litigation. The court held that "[n]otwithstanding the
numerosity of actions, movants have failed to persuade us that these ac-
tions share sufficient common questions of fact to warrant § 1407 trans-
fer."20 8 This was a substantial defeat for the plaintiffs because they lost the
economies of time and cost, as well as the sheer leverage, of handling the
pre-trial motions of all the federal cases in one forum.
The centralization denial was followed by a growing number of dis-
missals of the federal claims by the various district courts that had occasion
to rule.20 9 These courts virtually unanimously dismissed with prejudice
205. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000) (permitting "civil actions involving one or
more common questions of fact ... pending in different districts (to be] trans-
ferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings").
206. See In re Not-For-Profit Hospitals/Uninsured Patients Litig., 341 F. Supp.
2d 1354, 1356 (J.P.M.L. 2004) (denying centralization of actions).
207. See Multidistrict Judicial Panel Re'ects Motion to Consolidate, Transfer Charity
Care Cases, supra note 119 (observing that lawsuits "share a common theme").
208. See In re Not-For-Profit Hospitals, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 1356 (J.P.M.L. 2004)
(denying centralization).
209. See Grant v. Trinity Health-Mich., 390 F. Supp. 2d 643, 658 (E.D. Mich.
2005) (dismissing federal claims); Hutt v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., No. 04-03440,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21548, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2005) (same); Feliciano v.
Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., No. 04-CV-04177, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21565, at
*21 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2005) (same); McCoy v. E. Tex. Med. Ctr. Reg'l Healthcare
Sys., No. 2:04-CV-223, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19416, at *29-30 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 31,
2005) (same); Nash v. Lee Mem'l Health Sys., No. 204CV369FTM29DNF, 2005 WL
2043642, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2005) (same); Kabeller v. Orlando Reg'] Health-
care Sys., No. 6:04-cv-1106-Orl-19DAB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20219, at *5 (M.D.
Fla. Aug. 11, 2005) (same); Cygan v. Resurrection Med. Ctr., No. 04 C 4168, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19867, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 2005) (same); Gardner v. N. Miss.
Health Servs., No. 1:04cv235, 2005 WL 1312753, at *5 (N.D. Miss. May 31, 2005)
(same); Amato v. UPMC, 371 F. Supp. 2d 752, 759 (W.D. Pa. 2005) (same); Ellis v.
Phoebe Putney Health Sys., No. l:04-CV-80(WLS), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19935, at
*15 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 8, 2005) (same); Corley v. John D. Archibald Mem'l Hosp.,
Inc., No. 1:04-CV-110 (WLS), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8057, at *20 (M.D. Ga. Mar.
31, 2005) (same); Watts v. Advocate Health Care Network, No. 04 C 4062, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7418, at *14-15 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2005) (same); Valencia v. Miss.
Baptist Med. Ctr. Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 867, 873-76 (S.D. Miss. 2005) (same); Fields
v. Banner Health, No. CIV-04-1297-PHX-SRB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13481, at *22-
23 (D. Ariz. Mar. 23, 2005) (same);Jellison v. Fla. Hosp. Healthcare Sys., Inc., No.
6:04-cv-1021-Orl-28KRS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8036, at *26 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 14,
2005) (same); Quinn v. BJC Health Sys., 364 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1057 (E.D. Mo.
2005) (same); Wright v. St. Dominic Health Servs., Inc., No. 3:04CV521LN, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8086, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 1, 2005) (same); Schmitt v. Protestant
Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 04-CV-00577-DRH, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7449, at *28
(S.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2005) (same); Sabeta v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., No. 04-
21437-CIV-JORDAN, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6132, at *59 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 23, 2005)
(same); Hagedorn v. St. Thomas Hosp., Inc., No. 3:04-0526, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7259, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 7, 2005) (same); Peterson v. Fairview Health Servs.,
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the federal tax, FDCPA, EMTALA and § 1983 claims, and declined juris-
diction over the state law claims, dismissing them without prejudice to re-
plead in a state forum.2 1
0
Fatal to plaintiffs' federal tax claims was the district courts' uniform
rulings that the grant of a § 501 (c) (3) charitable tax exemption does not
create a contract between the recipient and the federal government.2 11
The courts indicated that such a holding was compelled by a historic line
of cases unequivocally rejecting the notion of such a contract: "The notion
that the Federal Income Tax is contractual or otherwise consensual in na-
ture is . . .utterly without foundation, . . . [and] has been repeatedly re-
jected by the courts."2 12 Based on this finding, the courts ruled that the
grant of a federal charitable tax exemption could not give rise to a claim
for breach of contract or breach of an implied contractual duty of good
faith and fair dealing.2 13 The district courts further held that even assum-
ing, arguendo, a contract existed, § 501 (c) (3) does not give rise to a private
Nos. 04-2973 ADM/AJB, 04-2974 ADM/AJB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1962, at *10
(D. Minn. Feb. 1, 2005) (same); Daly v. Baptist Health, No. 4:04CV789GH, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6270, at *14 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 31, 2005) (same); Washington v. Med.
Ctr. of Cent. Ga., Inc., No. 5:04-cv-185 (CAR), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2614, at *26
(M.D. Ga. Jan. 21, 2005) (same); Shriner v. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., No.
3:04CV7435, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 894, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 21, 2005) (same);
Hudson v. Cent. Ga. Health Servs., No. 5:04CV301 (DF), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2613, at *28 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 13, 2005) (same); Lorens v. Catholic Health Care Part-
ners, 356 F. Supp. 2d 827, 835 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (same); Ferguson v. Centura
Health Corp., 358 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1021 (D. Colo. 2004) (same); Burton v. Wil-
liam Beaumont Hosp., 347 F. Supp. 2d 486, 501 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (dismissing all
federal claims except for Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act);
Kizzire v. Baptist Health Sys., Inc., 343 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1085 (S.D. Ala. 2004);
Darr v. Sutter Health, No. C 04-02624 WHA, 2004 WL 2873068, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 30, 2004) (same); see also Burton v. William Beaumont Hosp., 373 F. Supp. 2d
707, 713-24 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (dismissing federal claims under Emergency Medi-
cal Treatment and Active Labor Act and state law claims).
210. For a further discussion of the federal tax, FDCPA, EMTALA and § 1983
claims asserted by the class action plaintiffs, see infra notes 211-30 and accompany-
ing text.
211. See, e.g., Gardner v. N. Miss. Health Servs., No. 1:04cv235, 2005 WL
1312753, at *3 (N.D. Miss. May 31, 2005) (finding no privately enforceable con-
tractual duty under § 501 (c) (3)); Lorens, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 832 (declaring that
"(n]o court has ever held that 501 (c) (3) creates a binding contract"); see also Valen-
cia, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 873-75 (finding no contract created by granting tax exempt
status under § 501 (c) (3)); Jellison, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8036, at *6-10 (same);
Wright, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8086, at *3 (same); Schmitt, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7449, at *19 (same); Sabeta, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6132, at *15 (same); Hagedorn,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7259, at *7 (same); Peterson, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1962, at
*4 (same); Daly, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6270, at *12 (same); Washington, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2614, at *6 (same); Shriner, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 894, at *3 (same);
Hudson, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2613, at *10 (same); Quinn, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1051-
52; Amato, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 755 (same); Burton, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 493-94 (same).
212. Amato, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 755 (quoting from McLaughlin v. Comm'r, 832
F.2d 986, 987 (7th Cir. 1987)).
213. See, e.g., id. at 755-56 (ruling against plaintiffs' contract claims).
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right of action21 4 and that plaintiffs lacked standing to assert such a
claim. 2 15 In addition, the courts ruled that § 501(c) (3) does not contain
language demonstrating intent to create a trust, so that there was no basis
to claim breach of a charitable trust.2 16 To the extent that unjust enrich-
ment or constructive trust claims were premised upon the existence of a
contract under § 501 (c) (3), the district courts dismissed those counts as
well. 2 17 Finally, the district courts dismissed the conspiracy and aiding
and abetting claims against the AHA to the extent that the claims were
based on the faulty federal breach of contract and breach of trust
claims. 2
18
214. See, e.g., id. at 756 (finding no private right of action under § 501 (c) (3)).
215. See, e.g.,Jellison, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8036, at *10-11 (ruling that there
is no language in § 501 (c) (3) demonstrating that plaintiffs were intended benefi-
ciaries of hospital's tax exempt status).
216. See, e.g., Amato, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 757 (finding IRS revenue rulings did
not evince creation of charitable trust under § 501 (c) (3)).
217. See, e.g., Quinn v. BJC Health Sys., 364 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1054-55 (E.D.
Mo. 2005) (dismissing count for unjust enrichment and constructive trust); see also
Kizzire v. Baptist Health Sys., 343 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1082-83 (S.D. Ala. 2004) (dis-
missing plaintiffs' unjust enrichment and constructive trust claims, inter alia, on
basis of resjudicata, holding that claims were compulsory counterclaims which were
required to be raised in state court collections actions, and that failure to raise
claims in that forum barred plaintiffs' ability to raise them in later action).
218. See, e.g., Lorens v. Catholic Health Care Partners, 356 F. Supp. 2d 827,
835 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (dismissing claims for aiding and abetting breach of con-
tract because no contract existed under § 501 (c) (3)). Even if the courts had
found the existence of a contract between the hospitals and the federal govern-
ment, a private right of action and standing, it still remains questionable whether,
under current revenue rulings, the contracts were breached by the hospitals' man-
ner of implementing charity care. In 1956, the IRS ruled that "[t]he fact that [a
hospital's] charity record is relatively low is not conclusive that a hospital is not
operated for charitable purposes .... ." See Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202. The
IRS declared that the only requirement was that the hospital must not turn away
patients due to their inability to pay. See id. (remarking that hospitals cannot re-
fuse to accept patients who cannot pay for services). In 1969, the IRS ruled that a
hospital that limits admissions only to those who can pay for their care and gener-
ally does not provide emergency services still can be tax exempt, insofar as it fur-
thers the charitable purpose of "providing hospital care on a nonprofit basis for
members of its community .. " SeeRev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (noting that
free services are not sole basis for charitable exemption); see also Rev. Rul. 83-157,
1983-2 C.B. 94 (ruling that hospital that limits admissions to patients able to pay
for their care, including Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries, and does not oper-
ate emergency room, nevertheless operates exclusively to benefit community and
is thus entitled to tax exempt status).
In 2001, the IRS heightened the test by declaring that the charity care require-
ment of the community benefit standard requires a hospital to demonstrate that it
delivers "significant health care services to the indigent." See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv.
Mem. 200110030, 2001 WL 234018, at *4 (Feb. 5, 2001) (strengthening charity
care requirements). The IRS further declared that "[t ] he provision of free or sub-
sidized care to the indigent is a significant indicator to the courts and the Service
that a hospital promotes health for the benefit of the community." See id. at *6.
Nevertheless, the Advice Memo falls short of stating an amount or form of charity
care that a hospital must provide to retain its tax exemption, and states that satis-
faction of the community benefit standard "is based on all the facts and circum-
[Vol. 51: p. 95
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The district courts dismissed the FDCPA claims because the statute
applies only to "debt collectors," 2 19 and the hospitals did not qualify as
debt collectors under the statutory definition. 22 0 Indeed, in at least one
case, plaintiffs conceded at the hearing on the dismissal motion that the
hospital defendant was not governed by the FDCPA.
22 1
Next, the district courts dismissed virtually all of the EMTAIA
claims. 222 The gist of plaintiffs' allegations was that the hospitals had re-
quired them to sign a guarantee of payment before rendering emergency
stances." See id. at *7 (explaining that whether hospital operates for charitable
purposes is inevitably case-by-case determination). Therefore, the standard cur-
rently does not require hospitals to offer a given amount or type of charity care.
219. The statute defines a "debt collector" as "any person who uses any instru-
mentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal pur-
pose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to
collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due
another." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2000). The term also "includes any creditor who,
in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which
would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such
debts." Id.
220. See, e.g., Darr v. Sutter Health, No. C 04-02624 WHA, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24592, at *14-16 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2004) (holding that "[c]reditors who
collect in their own name and whose principal business is not debt collection,
therefore, are not subject to the Act" (quoting Aubert v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 137
F.3d 976, 978 (7th Cir. 1998))); see also Washington v. Med. Ctr. of Cent. Ga., Inc.,
No. 5:04-cv-1 85, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2614, at *24 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 21, 2005) (opin-
ing that organization's principal purpose of business must be collection of debts to
fall under purview of statute); Hogland v. Athens Reg'l Health Servs., Inc., No.
3:04-cv-50, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7763, at *27 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 21, 2005) (same);
Burton v. William Beaumont Hosp., 347 F. Supp. 2d 486, 498 (E.D. Mich. 2004)
(same). But see, e.g., Sabeta v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., No. 04-21437-CIV-JOR-
DAN, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6132, at *50 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 23, 2005) (declining to
dismiss FDCPA claim to allow plaintiffs discovery to determine accuracy of hospi-
tal's defense that it is not debt collector); Carlson v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr.,
378 F. Supp. 2d 128, 132-33 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (refusing to dismiss FDCPA claim
based upon allegations that hospital attempted collection using another name [Re-
gional Claims Recovery Service], which under statute allows hospital to be deemed
debt collector and therefore subject to Act).
221. See Darr, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24592, at *14 (acknowledging that defen-
dant is neither creditor nor debt collector and thus not governed by FDCPA).
222. See, e.g., Burton v. William Beaumont Hosp., 373 F. Supp. 2d 707, 713-16
(E.D. Mich. 2005) (finding plaintiffs failed to state EMTALA claim); Gardner v. N.
Miss. Health Servs., No. 1:04cv235, 2005 WL 1312753, at *5-6 (N.D. Miss. May 31,
2005) (holding that plaintiffs failed to allege personal harm to support claim
under EMTALA);Jellison v. Fla. Hosp. Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. 6:04-cv-1021-Orl-
28KRS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8036, at *13-15 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2005) (same);
Quinn, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1049-50 (stating that reasonable registration process that
does not delay screening or treatment is not violative of EMTALA); Wright v. St.
Dominic Health Servs., Inc., No. 3:04CV521LN, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8086, at *4
(S.D. Miss. Mar. 1, 2005) (same); Sabeta, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6132, at *32-36
(same); Peterson v. Fairview Health Servs., Nos. 04-2973 ADM/AJB, 04-2974 ADM/
AJB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1962, at *25-28 (D. Minn. Feb. 1, 2005) (same); Hog-
land, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7763, at *22-25 (same); Washington, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2614, at *18-22 (same); Amato v. UPMC, 371 F. Supp. 2d 752, 759 (W.D. Pa.
2004) (same); Kizzire, 343 F. Supp. 2d at 1084-85 (same).
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treatment.223 The district courts ruled that EMTALA does not forbid such
inquiries into ability to pay, "so long as [the hospital's] inquiry does not
delay screening or treatment." 224 Because the EMTALA claimants had re-
ceived prompt emergency treatment despite the hospitals' inquiries re-
garding source of payment, there was no basis to assert a violation of
EMTALA.2 25 In addition, the federal courts ruled that EMTALA claim-
ants must suffer "personal harm" due to the hospital's delay or refusal to
render emergency treatment.2 26 Here the EMTALA claimants asserted
that they had suffered "economic injury" only, rendering their EMTALA
claims deficient.
22 7
223. See, e.g., Amato, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 758 (stating plaintiffs' allegation that
"before UPMC provided them emergency medical screening or treatment, it first
determined their ability to pay for such care and required them to sign form con-
tracts agreeing to pay UPMC in full for their care").
224. See, e.g., id. (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d) (4) (iv) (2005)) (permitting
hospitals to conduct "reasonable registration processes" for emergency patients).
The court stated:
Hospitals may follow reasonable registration processes for individuals for
whom examination or treatment is required by this section, including ask-
ing whether an individual is insured and, if so, what that insurance is, so
long as that inquiry does not delay screening or treatment.
Id.
225. See, e.g., id. (explaining that EMTALA claim fails because no allegation
that hospital delayed screening or treating plaintiffs); see also PRYOR, UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES, supra note 79, at 1 ("EMTALA only requires that hospitals provide
acute care, and it does not require that they provide the care for free or at a
discount.").
226. See, e.g., Amato, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 758 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d) (2)
(A) (2005)) (allowing both damages for injury and equitable relief for those in-
jured by delayed screening or treatment). The statute provides:
Any individual who suffers personal harm as a direct result of a participat-
ing hospital's violation of a requirement of this section may, in a civil
action against the participating hospital, obtain those damages available
for personal injury under the law of the State in which the hospital is
located, and such equitable relief as is appropriate.
Id. (emphasis added).
227. See id. at 758-59 (ruling EMTALA claim deficient because plaintiffs al-
leged economic injury only); see also Ferguson v. Centura Health Corp., 358 F.
Supp. 2d 1014, 1020 (D. Colo. 2004) (declining to rule on EMTALA claim as hos-
pital defendants had not moved to dismiss that claim, but noting that plaintiffs had
failed to allege personal harm). Several district courts stated additional grounds
for dismissal of the EMTALA claims. See, e.g., Jellison, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8036,
at *15 (dismissing EMTALA claim as time barred); Sabeta, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6132, at *37-38 (same); Quinn, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1054 (same); Kizzire, 343 F. Supp.
2d at 1084-85 (same); Burton, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 714 (same). At least one court
ruled that the EMTALA claim was defective in that the challenged conduct oc-
curred after plaintiff had been admitted to the hospital as an inpatient, and that
EMTALA applies only to emergency room treatment, citing the proposition that
"[i]f the hospital admits the individual as an inpatient for further treatment, the
hospital's obligation [under EMTALA] ends." See Quinn, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1054
(citing 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(a)(1)(ii)) (discharging hospital's obligation under EM-
TALA when it admits emergency patient as inpatient).
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The district courts' dismissals of the § 1983 claims were equally deci-
sive. 22 8 The courts ruled that a private hospital's receipt of federal and
state funding and tax exempt status does not transform it into a state ac-
tor, 2 2 9 and that none of the state action tests had been met.
2 30
Finally, nearly unanimously,2 3 1 the federal district courts declined to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims once all the
federal claims were dismissed. 232 These state law claims were dismissed
without prejudice to be asserted in a state court action.23 3
Not only were the district courts' dismissals of the federal claims re-
markable for their uniformity, but at least one federal district court judge
declared that based on all the prior dismissals, he would examine the
claims very carefully in light of Rule I I's prohibition of frivolous claims.
2 3 4
228. See, e.g., Sabeta, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6132, at *52-57 (holding that pri-
vate hospital is not state actor for purposes of § 1983 claim); Hogland v. Athens
Reg'l Health Servs., Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7763, at *28-31 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 21,
2005) (same); Washington v. Med. Ctr. of Cent. Ga., Inc., No. 5:04-cv-185 (CAR),
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2614, at *26-28 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 21, 2005) (same); Burton v.
William Beaumont Hosp., 347 F. Supp. 2d 486, 498-99 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (same).
229. See, e.g., Burton, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 499 (defining state action).
230. See, e.g., Washington, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2614, at *26-29 (setting forth
state action test). The three tests to determine if action is taken under color of
state law are as follows:
A private party may be held liable as a state actor only if one of the follow-
ing three conditions is met: (1) the State has coerced or at least signifi-
candy encouraged the action alleged to violate the Constitution ("State
compulsion test"); (2) the private parties performed a public function
that was traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State ("public func-
tion test"); or (3) the State had so far insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence with the [private parties] that it was a joint participant
in the enterprise ("nexus/joint action test").
Id. at *26.
231. But see Kolari v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Hosp., 382 F. Supp. 2d 562, 573
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing all federal and state law claims with prejudice); Bobo v.
Christus Health, No. 1:04-CV-626, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7249, at *11-13 (E.D. Tex.
Apr. 26, 2005) (same).
232. See, e.g., Darr v. Sutter Health, No. C 04-02624 WHA, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24592, at *16 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdic-
tion). The court cites the proposition that:
In the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before
trial, the balance of the factors to be considered under the pendentjuris-
diction doctrine-judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity-
will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining
state-law claims.
Id. (citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 7 (1998)).
233. See, e.g., id. at *16.
234. See Charity Care Class Action Litigation Is Denied Federal Status, supra note
118, at 6 n.10 (quoting Collins v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., No. 3:04CV00276 (N.D. Fla.
Dec. 10, 2004)) (noting concerns whether plaintiffs' claims were frivolous).
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Perhaps the most telling dismissal of the federal claims was that of
Rivera v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc.23 5 The allegations against Yale New
Haven Hospital were among the nation's most egregious, so that dismissal
of these federal claims signaled most clearly that the hospitals' billing and
collections practices were simply not actionable under the federal tax laws,
EMTALA or FDCPA.236
These dismissals led to a rash of voluntary withdrawals by plaintiffs in
the federal district courts, presumably to re-file in state forums.2 37 In one
such case, the court held the plaintiffs and their counsel jointly liable for
an attorney's fee award to the hospital of $40,000.238 The court noted the
extraordinary nature of such an award, 23 9 but justified it because "the
plaintiffs' claims likely amounted to millions of dollars and would have, at
a minimum, forced major changes in the financial operations and struc-
ture of [the hospital]." 240 Further, the court noted that plaintiffs had
made "lengthy, pointed and serious accusations of misconduct ... [that
would] tend to discredit the defendant in ways that would reasonably be
expected to garner substantial public attention."24 1 While the court rec-
ognized that the indigent plaintiffs would have little or no ability to re-
235. No. 3:04-CV-1515 (D. Conn. Feb. 8, 2005); see also Claims Against Yale-New
Haven Hospital Dismissed in Oral Ruling by Federal Court, supra note 119, at 241 (dis-
cussing dismissal of federal claims).
236. For a discussion of the aggressive hospital billing and collections prac-
tices used by Yale-New Haven Hospital, see supra notes 23-32.
237. See In re Not-For-Profit Hospitals/Uninsured Patients Litig., 341 F. Supp.
2d 1354, 1356 n.1 (J.P.M.L. 2004) (citing to voluntary dismissals of several actions
brought in federal court); see also Hagedorn v. St. Thomas Hosp., Inc., No. 3:04-
0526, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7259, at *7 n.3 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 7, 2005) (citing
voluntary dismissals granted by federal courts in other charity care class actions).
Reportedly, in some cases the Scruggs team moved to voluntarily dismiss their
federal cases when confronted with a demand from the court to produce evidence
in response to dismissal motions from the hospitals. See Dodging a Bullet; Scruggs
Has Four Hospital Class-Action Suits Dismissed, 34 MODERN HEALTHCARE 14 (2004)
(reporting dismissals initiated by Scruggs team when required to produce
evidence).
One published report declared that as of February 17, 2005, approximately
seventeen cases filed in federal courts had been voluntarily dismissed by the plain-
tiffs. See Claims Against Yale-New Haven Hospital Dismissed in Oral Ruling by Federal
Court, supra note 119, at 241 (reporting that federal hostility to plaintiff claims
against hospitals has led to widespread voluntary dismissals).
238. See Woodrum v. Integris Health, Inc., No. 5:04-CV-835, 2004 WL
3397808, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 30, 2004) (concluding $40,000 is reasonable
amount to award defendant).
239. See id. at *2 (stating that "[t] he court is mindful of the risk that an award
of attorneys' fees in this context might unreasonably chill the prospect of these or
other potential plaintiffs bringing an otherwise reasonable class action").
240. See id. (explaining that it would be unfair to put defendant's very exis-
tence at issue, force it to expend substantial defense costs and then merely dismiss
case).
241. See id. (noting that plaintiffs complaint attacked reputation of defen-
dant, would garner unfavorable publicity, and that dismissing case would unfairly
deprive defendant of opportunity to put forth truth about its operations).
[Vol. 51: p. 95
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spond to the fee award, the court stated that its concern was ameliorated
by the fact that the lawsuit appeared to be part of a "coordinated, nation-
wide effort" to attack non-profit hospitals, and was "more attorney driven
than client driven." 242
The wholesale federal dismissals have likely discouraged some defen-
dant hospitals from prematurely settling these cases in an effort to avoid
the enormous time commitments and expenses that they entail. 243
IX. EARLY CHARrTY CARE CLAss ACTiON RULINGS ON THE
STATE LAW CLAIMS
As a result of the numerous class action dismissals in the federal fo-
rums, the focus of the class actions has been shifting to state courts. 244 In
contrast to the ruling on the federal claims, some early results on the state
claims have been favorable for the plaintiffs. The Connecticut Superior
Court in Ahmad v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc.24 5 sustained plaintiffs' state
law claims against Yale-New Haven Hospital based upon Connecticut's bed
242. See id.
243. In April 2005, North Mississippi Health Services announced that it would
not finalize a settlement that it had tentatively agreed to in August 2004. See Missis-
sippi Nonprofit Hospital System Shuns Proposed Charity Care Settlement, 14 Health L.
Rep. (BNA) 513, 513 (2005) (reporting on lawsuit against North Mississippi
Health Services). The hospital reportedly stated that the increased number of
claims for charity care that had arisen since it had signed the memorandum of
understanding had forced it to rethink its decision to settle. See id. (quoting hospi-
tal official as saying it had "reached an impasse in its attempt to reach a final agree-
ment with respect to charity discounted care to the uninsured" largely because
claims are rising too high and too many patients are bypassing other local hospitals
in order to receive charity care). For a discussion of class action settlements that
have occurred, see infra notes 299-312 and accompanying text.
244. See As Federal Trial Court Setbacks Continue, Uninsured Plaintiffs Head for
State Courts, 14 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 208, 208 (2005) (stating that Scruggs, coordi-
nating litigator, announced that lawsuits will be shifting from federal to state
forums).
245. No. (X02)CV040183725S, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2765 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Sept. 29, 2004).
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fund law2 4 6 and the state's unfair trade law.2 4 7 An Illinois state court
246. See id. at *23 ("[Pjlaintiffs have pleaded that the defendants failed to
provide them adequate notice of the availability of free bed funds and failed to
process properly any bed funds applications. . . .These specifications would, if
proven, constitute violations of the statute.").
Connecticut's bed fund law provides:
(b) (1) Each hospital which holds or administers one or more hospital
bed funds shall post or cause to be posted in a conspicuous public place
in each patient admitting location, including but not limited to, the ad-
missions office, emergency room, social services department and patient
accounts or billing office, information regarding the availability of its hos-
pital bed funds .... Such information shall include: (A) Notification of
the existence of hospital bed funds and the hospital's program to admin-
ister them and (B) the person to contact for application information.
(2) Each hospital which has a hospital bed fund shall train staff, in-
cluding but not limited to, hospital social workers, discharge plan-
ners and billing personnel concerning the existence of such fund,
the eligibility requirements and the procedures for application.
(c) Each hospital which holds or administers one or more hospital bed
funds shall make available to individual members of the public, a one-
page summary describing hospital bed funds and how to apply for them.
This summary shall clearly distinguish hospital bed funds from other
sources of financial assistance. The summary shall be available in the pa-
tient admissions office, emergency room, social services department and
patient accounts or billing office. If during the admissions process or
during its review of the financial resources of the patient, the hospital
reasonably believes the patient will have limited funds to pay for any por-
tion of the patient's hospitalization not covered by insurance, the hospital
shall provide the summary to each such patient.
CONN. GEN.. STAT. § 19a-509b (2003).
247. See Ahmad, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2765, at *27-28 (ruling that defend-
ants' practices violated public policy). The court opined:
[T]he defendants engaged in aggressive debt collection practices-such
as wage garnishments, collection calls, capias arrests, placement and fore-
closure of liens, and seizure of assets-despite their actual or constructive
knowledge that the plaintiffs were eligible for free beds under the bed
funds statute or discounted care under the collecting at cost statute...
sufficiently state a case that the defendants' practices offended public pol-
icy established by statutes or were 'immoral, unethical, oppressive, or un-
scrupulous' so as to satisfy the 'cigarette rule' test of unfair trade practice.
Id. Connecticut's Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) provides as follows: "No
person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-
l0b (a) (2004).
The Ahmad court, however, dismissed a claim under the "collecting at cost
statute." See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-673(b) (2003) (providing that "no hospital
that has provided health care services to an uninsured patient may collect from the
uninsured patient more than the cost of providing services"). That court held that
the express language of the statute foreclosed the claim where plaintiffs were una-
ble to show that the hospital had collected more than its cost. See Ahmad, 2004
Conn. Super. LEXIS 2765, at *26-27 (ruling that plaintiffs cannot redress
overcharging under statute unless hospital collects more than its cost). Ironically,
this statute, promulgated to prevent excessive hospital charges to the uninsured,
was of no assistance to the plaintiffs because they were too indigent to pay the bills.
In addition, the Ahmad court dismissed state law claims for breach of contract (no
allegations that hospital agreed to charge the plaintiffs third-party rates), recission
(refund of medical services was impossible) and tortious interference with plain-
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ruled in Servedio v. Our Lady of the Resurrection Medical CenteY248 that state
law claims alleging consumer fraud, 249 unfair practices 250 and breach of
contract were adequately pleaded.
25 1
In contrast to these favorable state rulings, several federal courts
opted to dismiss plaintiffs' state law claims with prejudice, thereby preclud-
ing any re-filing in a state forum. The court in Kolari v. New York-Presbyte-
rian Hospitat2 5 2 ruled that the hospital was not required to provide
discounted care as a condition of its state tax exemption. 2 53 Further, the
court rejected plaintiffs' state law breach of contract claim on the basis
that the hospital's charges were not unreasonable simply because the hos-
pital had negotiated lower rates with governmental programs and private
payors. 254 The court rejected plaintiffs' state unfair trade 25 5 claim on the
ground that the hospital had not made deceptive statements. 25 6 Plaintiffs'
unjust enrichment claim also failed because plaintiffs had not paid their
tiffs' relationships with financial institutions (no allegations that hospital even
knew about these relationships). See id. at *29-30 (explaining dismissal of claims).
248. No. 04 L 3381, slip op. (Cir. Ct. Ill. Jan. 6, 2005) (granting defendants'
motion to dismiss on April 19, 2005).
249. See id. at 3-6 (rejecting defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' con-
sumer fraud claim). The Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Prac-
tices Act (ICFA) prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices." See 815 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 505/2 (1999).
250. See Servedio, No. 04 L 3381, at 7-8 (ruling that plaintiffs adequately stated
claim for unfair practices under ICFA where they alleged that hospital charged
uninsured patients higher rates than most other patients and did not screen pa-
tients to identify those who qualified for charity care).
251. See id. at 9-10 (ruling that plaintiffs adequately stated claim for breach of
implied duty to charge reasonable price where hospital gave discount to all in-
sured patients, potentially rendering its so called "usual and customary charges"
billed to uninsured patients unreasonable); see also Cristiani v. Advocate Health
Sys. Care Network, Inc., No. 03 L 14635, slip op. at 3-9 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill.
Nov. 15, 2004) (declaring viability of plaintiffs' state law breach of contract or alter-
native unjust enrichment claim pending amended pleadings, but dismissing plain-
tiffs' tortious interference claim); Hudson v. Cent. Ga. Health Servs., No.
5:04CV301 (DF), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2613, at *18-19 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 13, 2005)
(declaring, in dicta, that where hospital has two sets of "regular" prices, one for
insurers and governmental programs and another for uninsured patients, its con-
tractual promise to uninsured to charge "regular" prices may be ambiguous). But
see Pitts v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., No. 04CV1991-3, slip op. at 3-11 (Super.
Ct. Dougherty County, Ga. June 27, 2005) (dismissing plaintiffs' complaint upon
finding no merit to plaintiffs' state law claims for breach of contract, breach of
duty of good faith and fair dealing, constructive trust, deceptive trade practices,
fraud, constructive fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty
and negligence).
252. 382 F. Supp. 2d 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
253. See id. at 575 (characterizing claim as "baseless").
254. See id. at 576 (rejecting plaintiffs' breach of contract claim).
255. New York General Business Law Section 349(a) prohibits "[d]eceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce." See N.Y. GEN.
Bus. LAw § 349(a) (McKinney 2004).
256. See Kolari, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 577 (ruling that hospital's charging plain-
tiffs higher rates does not make its statements deceptive).
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bills and thus had not enriched the hospital. 257 The district court dis-
missed plaintiffs' state law fraud claim due to failure to plead fraud with
particularity and failure to plead the elements of fraudulent intent and
detrimental reliance. 258 The court dismissed the constructive fraud claim,
ruling that plaintiffs had not established that the hospital had a duty to
speak or that it had fiduciary obligations to plaintiffs. 259 Another district
court, following Kolari, also dismissed plaintiffs' state law claims with
prejudice, ruling that they were "indispensably premised" on the meritless
federal claims.2 6
0
It is possible that the inconsistent results in the state and federal fo-
rums on the state law claims signal merely that the state forums will be
more receptive to plaintiffs' state causes of action. It is equally likely, how-
ever, that the state actions will yield mixed results. 2 61 These state claims
necessarily depend upon unique state interpretations of common law or
upon particular language of state statutes, so that one state's outcome
does not necessarily predict what will happen in others.
There have also been some interesting developments in at least one
state's tax agency. In April 2005, Illinois tax officials recommended deny-
ing property tax exemptions for parcels owned by the Carle Founda-
tion.26 2 The officials found that Carle does not meet the state's criteria
for a charitable tax exemption because, among other reasons, it
overcharged the uninsured and spent only one-half of one percent of its
revenue on charity care.263 A similar tax ruling was rendered earlier in
the same forum against Provena Covenant Hospital. 264
257. See id. at 577-78 (rejecting unjust enrichment claim).
258. See id. at 578 (dismissing fraud claim).
259. See id. at 578-79 (dismissing constructive fraud claim).
260. See Bobo v. Christus Health, No. 1:04-CV-626, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7249, at *12 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2005) (declaring that "these meritless claims
against not-for-profit hospitals has the hospitals bleeding green"); see also Burton v.
William Beaumont Hosp., 373 F. Supp. 2d 707, 724 (E.D. Mich. June 20, 2005)
(granting summaryjudgment to hospital on state law claims for breach of contract,
violation of Michigan Consumer Protection Act, unjust enrichment and construc-
tive trust).
261. See, e.g., Pitts v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., No. 04CV1991-3, slip op.
(Super. Ct. Dougherty County, Ga. June 27, 2005) (illustrating dismissal of plain-
tiffs' state law claims in state forum).
262. See Another Illinois Nonprofit Hospital Caught in Move to Revoke Property Tax
Exemption, 14 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 583, 583 (2005) (discussing county board's
recommendation to state's Department of Revenue to deny Carle Foundation Hos-
pital charitable tax exemptions).
263. See id. at 583 (reporting that Carle Foundation provided "relatively small
amount of true charity care").
264. See id. (reporting similar ruling against Provena Covenant Hospital). In
February 2004, the State of Illinois upheld Champaign County's decision to revoke
Provena Covenant Medical Center's local property tax exemption. See CAROL
PRYOR & ROBERT SEIFERT, THE ACCESS PROJECT, THE HELLER SCHOOL FOR SOCIAL
POLICY AND MANAGEMENT, BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES, AN
UPDATE ON CONSUMER MEDICAL DEBT, http://www.cmwf.org/usrAdoc/pryor_medi-
caldebt_749.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2005) [hereinafter UPDATE ON CONSUMER
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X. CHANGES OCCURRING IN HOSPITALS' UNINSURED BILLING AND
COLLECTIONS PRACTICES
At this relatively early stage in the state forum-based charity care class
actions, it is difficult to predict what the outcomes will be. After examin-
ing the voluntary changes that hospitals have made to their billing and
collections policies and the terms of the few settlements that have oc-
curred, however, we can begin to see the changes that are likely to result
regarding hospitals' billing and collections practices.
Once the House Committee on Energy and Commerce commenced
its investigation into hospitals' billing practices, hospital associations
moved swiftly in an attempt to contain the problem.2 65 The AHA issued
an "Alert" on June 10, 2003 to its 4,800 member hospitals across the coun-
try, urging them to stop harsh collections tactics for patients who did not
have the ability to pay and reminding hospitals that "compassion has to go
from the bedside to the billing office." 266 The AHA Alert suggested that
hospitals should be able to state their charges to patients before treat-
ment, should identify low-income patients who might qualify for free or
discounted care and should avoid harsh collections practices.
26 7
In December 2003, the AHA followed up by issuing guidelines for
billing and collections. 2 68 The guidelines suggest that hospitals should
communicate clearly with patients about charges, help patients apply for
free or discounted care, review charge levels to make sure they are reason-
able and pursue patient accounts in a fair manner.269 The guidelines
have reportedly been adopted by 3000 of the AHA's member hospitals.
2 70
State hospital associations followed suit. The Healthcare Association
of New York State (HANYS) was one of the earliest to publish its own bill-
MEDICAL DEBT] (stating that revocation was due to "past aggressive debt collection
practices (including lawsuits) toward needy patients"). The case is presently on
appeal before an administrative law judge. See Another Illinois Nonprofit Hospital
Caught in Move to Revoke Property Tax Exemption, supra note 262, at 583 (noting
pending appeal).
265. See Lucette Lagnado, Hospitals Urged to End Harsh Tactics for Billing Unin-
sured, WALL ST. J., July 7, 2003, at A9 (reporting changes to billing and collections
suggested by AHA).
266. See id. (emphasizing hospitals' "relationship with their communities that
is built on trust and compassion").
267. See id. (detailing elements of plan to ameliorate harsh billing and collec-
tions practices and provide more upfront discussion of payment expectations with
indigent patients).
268. See AHA, Hospital Billing and Collection Practices: Statement of Princi-
ples and Guidelines by the Board of Trustees of the American Hospital Associa-
tion, http://www.hospitalconnect.com/aha/keyissues/bcp/content/guidelines
finalweb.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2005) (discussing guidelines).
269. See id. (explaining guidelines).
270. See Leonard Post, Hospitals Hit with Plague of Lawsuits; Unfair Billing Prac-
tices Alleged Against Nonprofits, 26 NAT'L L.J. 1, 1 (July 19, 2004) (reporting adoption
of AHA guidelines).
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ing and collections guidelines. 2 7 1 HANYS recommended that hospitals
should promulgate financial aid policies to provide financial assistance to
all patients below 200% of the federal poverty level and sliding scale dis-
counts to indigent patients with incomes at higher levels. 272 Significantly,
HANYS suggested that hospitals could apply Medicaid or private insurer
rates to the low-income uninsured, rather than full charges.273 HANYS
also asked hospitals to communicate their financial aid policies to patients
and train their staffs to administer the policies. 2 74 Finally, HANYS urged
against foreclosures on patients' primary residences and body attach-
ments, as well as asking hospitals to forego garnishments of wages unless
there was evidence that the patients had resources to pay their bills. 27 5
The primary author of the HANYS guidelines, Ray Sweeney, described the
message of the guidelines as "[d]on't try to get blood from a stone." 27 6
Other state hospital associations approved similar billing and collections
guidelines for their member hospitals, including those in California, 27 7
Oregon, 278 Illinois279 and Tennessee. 280
Individual hospitals also announced changes that they were volunta-
rily implementing. A major not-for-profit hospital chain, HCA Inc., based
in Nashville, Tennessee, announced in fall 2003 that it would provide free
care to uninsured patients earning up to twice the federal poverty level
271. See HEALTHCARE ASS'N OF N.Y. STATE, FINANCIAL AID/CHARITY CARE POL-
ICY AT NEW YORK's NOT-FOR-PROFIT HOSPITALS: GUIDELINES FROM THE HEALTHCARE
ASSOCIATION OF NEW YoRK STATE 1, 1-7 (2004), available at http://www.hanys.org/
digital-library/hanys/upload/Financial-Aid-Charity-Care-Policy-at-New-York-s-Not-
for-Profit-Hospitals-Guideines-from-the-Healthcare-Association-of-New-York-State.
pdf (setting forth guidelines).
272. See id. at 2-3 (recommending financial aid policies).
273. See id. at 3 (discussing application of Medicaid or private insured rates
for low-income patients).
274. See id. at 4 (reminding hospitals to communicate availability of financial
aid to patients).
275. See id. at 5 (reminding hospitals to "have collections policies that reflect
the mission and values of the hospital").
276. Lagnado, Cold-Case Files: Dunned for Old Bills, Poor Find Some Hospitals
Never Forget, supra note 98.
277. See CAL. Hosp. ASS'N, CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL BILLING AND COLLECTION
PRACTICES: VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR ASSISTING LOW-INCOME UN-
INSURED PATIENTS 5 (2004), available at http://www.calhealth.org/Download/Vol-
PrinciplesGuidlines204.pdf (adopting voluntary principles and guidelines for
assisting low-income uninsured patients).
278. See Gwen Dayton, Oregon Ass'n of Hosps. and Health Systs., Hospital
Discounting and Collection Practices, http://www.oahhs.org/publications/legal-
servicesbulletindiscounting.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2005) (recommending dis-
counted rates and fee waivers for indigent patients).
279. See ILL. Hosp. Ass'N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON CHARITY CARE AND
COLLECTION PRACTICES FOR THE UNINSURED 5-6 (2003), available at http://www.
ihatoday.org/issues/payment/uninsured/charitycare.pdf (stating billing and col-
lections guidelines for indigent patients).
280. See Guidelines for Uninsured, Indigent Adopted by State Hospital Association, 13
Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1459, 1459 (2004) (reporting Tennessee Hospital Associa-
tion House of Delegates' approval of voluntary charity care guidelines).
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and sliding scale discounts for patients with earnings up to four times the
poverty level. 28 1 HCA's new policy went into effect on January 1, 2005.282
Tenet Healthcare Corp., a large for-profit chain, announced that it was
ready to implement a compact with uninsured patients, pledging to bill
low-income uninsured patients at the same rates the chain received from
HMOs, subject to approval of the policy from the OIG. 28 3 North Shore-
Long IslandJewish Health System unveiled plans to provide financial assis-
tance to patients earning up to 300% of the federal poverty level.
284
Other hospital systems have made similar announcements.
285
On the regulatory front, HHS moved quickly to issue guidance con-
firming that "hospitals can provide discounts to uninsured and underin-
sured patients who cannot afford their hospital bills and to Medicare
beneficiaries who cannot afford their Medicare cost-sharing obliga-
tions." 286 HHS declared that "The Federal anti-kickback statute does not pro-
hibit discounts to uninsured patients who are unable to pay their hospital bills."
287
With regard to Medicare beneficiaries, however, HHS continued to warn
that to avoid anti-kickback risk, the hospitals should not routinely waive
cost sharing amounts without first verifying financial need or before rea-
sonable collection efforts have failed.288 In December 2004, HHS further
281. See Lagnado, Medical Shift, supra note 99 (describing Hospital Corpora-
tion of America (HCA) policy to discount rates to indigent patients).
282. See HCA Says It Will Provide Discounts to Uninsured, Cites New CMS Guidance,
14 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 68, 68 (2005) (discussing implementation of newly
adopted charity care policy).
283. See Lucette Lagnado, Taming Hospital Billing-Lawmakers Push Legislation
to Curb Aggressive Collection Against Uninsured Patients, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2003, at
BI [hereinafter Lagnado, Taming Hospital Billing] (detailing Tenet Healthcare
Corporation's pledge to offer discounts to uninsured patients).
284. See Cinda Becker, Bill Collection, Self-Reflection, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Feb.
9, 2004, at 8 (noting that such assistance would exceed recommendations for char-
ity care from Healthcare Association of New York State).
285. For example, at the end of 2003, the nation's largest Catholic hospital
chain, Ascension Health, stated that it would offer free care to every uninsured
patient whose income falls below the federal poverty level. See Lagnado, Medical
Shift, supra note 99 (outlining new charity care policy for indigent patients who do
not qualify for Medicaid). Yale-New Haven Hospital reportedly closed accounts
where the debts were more than five years old, removed property liens against
patients and created a sliding scale to provide discounted and free care to indigent
patients. See Ellen Moskowitz, Recent Developments in Health Law: Class Action Suits
Allege Improper Charitable Care Practices, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 168, 169 (2005)
(describing steps Yale-New Haven Hospital has taken to implement charity care).
The University of California-Davis reportedly has a policy of not suing uninsured
patients to collect debts. See Lagnado, Medical Markup, supra note 100 (stating
policy).
286. See Letter from Tommy G. Thompson, Secretary of Health and Human
Services, to Richard J. Davidson, President of the American Hospital Ass'n (Feb.
19, 2004), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2004pres/20040219.html.
287. See OFPERED DiscouNrs, supra note 179, at 1.
288. See id. at 1-4; see also Questions on Charges for the Uninsured, supra note
203 (providing guidance on application of Medicare payment rules to hospital dis-
counting practices).
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clarified that hospitals could offer across-the-board discounts to uninsured
patients without first making individualized determinations of need and
that such discounting policies would not affect the hospitals' Medicare
reimbursements. 289
Several state and local governments also acted, promulgating statutes
requiring hospitals to make their charges public, 290 to disclose their char-
ity care policies 291 and to restrict their collections procedures. 2 92 Several
289. See Ctr. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Services, FAQ http://www.cms.gov/providers/FAQUninsuredAddi-
tional.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2006) (stating that, contrary to earlier statement
made by OIG, "when a hospital discounts charges to non-Medicare patients, such
as uninsured patients, there is no effect on outlier payments under either Medi-
care's Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment System or Medicare's Hospital Out-
patient Prospective Payment System"). OIG, at a previous congressional hearing,
had declared that an across-the-board waiver of cost sharing obligations for unin-
sured patients would be "problematic," insisting that "[t]here would need to be an
individualized determination" of indigency. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 147 (state-
ment of Lewis Morris, Chief Counsel, Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services) (stating that individualized determinations
would be necessary).
Here, however, the OIG may have confused uninsured patients with Medicare
patients. Copayments are payable only when there is another primary payor, i.e.,
an insurance plan, so that uninsured patients are never in a position of paying
copayments. In fact, the OIG later stated:
[W]hen we talk about Medicare co-pays and deductibles, we are therefore
talking about people who have insurance, they are covered by a program,
as distinct from those who are uninsured, for which, from a fraud and
abuse standpoint, we have no jurisdiction directly. So, if we are talking
about waivers of co-pays and deductibles for those who have Medicare
coverage, what we expect is some reasonable assessment of financial need
with a great deal of flexibility.
Id.
290. See Assem. B. 1627, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003) (enacted)
(requiring California hospitals to make their charge levels public); see also
Lagnado, Medical Markup, supra note 100 (reporting that California law requires
hospitals to disclose charges on all their items and services). Wisconsin requires
hospitals to report certain price increases. See WHA Information Center, http://
www.whainfocenter.com (last visited Nov. 20, 2005) (accepting data submissions
for hospital price increases). Arizona hospitals are required to report patient
charges, which are compiled and published semiannually. See ARIz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 36-125.06 (2004).
291. New York's Nassau and Suffolk counties passed local laws requiring hos-
pitals to notify patients of charity care policies. See NAssAu COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN.
CODE § 9-23 (2003) (adopting resolution requiring notification to patients); SuF-
FOLK CouN-TY, N.Y., LocAL LAw No. 25-2003 (2003) (same).
292. A Connecticut law went into effect in October 2003 placing restrictions
on collections procedures for hospital patients and limiting interest on bills to five
percent. See 2003 CONN. Acrs 266 (Reg. Sess.) (enacted) (establishing collections
restrictions and interest limits); see also Lagnado, Medical Shift, supra note 99 (re-
porting that statute makes it more difficult for hospitals to sue patients, seize their
bank accounts and place liens on their homes).
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state legislatures considered statutes to limit charges to the uninsured.293
Congress is considering a bill to require hospitals to post their charges.
294
In recognition of these changes, the authors of The Commonwealth
Fund report issued an updated report. 295 They pointed out hospitals'
abandonment of harsh collections practices, the passage of state laws to
ameliorate harsh treatment of the uninsured, several states' consideration
of bills to limit uninsured charges, the adoption of billing and collections
guidelines by state hospital associations and regulatory clarifications from
HHS.296 The report declared that "[t]hese developments have signifi-
cantly altered the environment related to hospital billing and collection
practices" and "represent a major shift in the environment surrounding
the development and implementation of hospital financial assistance poli-
cies." 29 7 The authors questioned, however, whether hospitals' voluntary
efforts would be sufficient to curb the abuses, or whether legislation was
necessary. 298
On March 10, 2005, Tenet Healthcare Corporation announced a pro-
posed agreement to settle thirteen charity care cases against it.2 9 9 This
293. See, e.g., Assem. B. 2521, 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005) (an-
nouncing bill to limit hospital charges to patients with household income at or
below 400% of federal poverty level to amount hospital would have accepted from
Medicare or its highest volume payor); H.B. 805, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2004)
(presenting bill to prohibit hospitals and other healthcare providers from charg-
ing uninsured patients more than Medicare rate); H.R. 1533, 1573, 147th Gen.
Assem, Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2004) (considering two bills to prohibit hospitals from
charging uninsured patient greater rate than average managed care rate); S.B.
379, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003) (presenting bill to cap hospital charges to
low income patients at Medicare or workers' compensation amounts); S.B. 2579,
93rd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2003) (considering bill to prohibit hospitals from
charging patients with incomes equal to or less than federal poverty level and to
limit charges to cost for patients with incomes up to 400% of federal poverty level).
But see CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-13-119 (2004) (prohibiting providers from waiving
deductibles and copayments as "regular business practice," but allowing such waiv-
ers for charity care where providers determine indigency on case-by-case basis and
where such waivers are not applied to more than one-quarter of providers'
patients).
294. See Hospital Price Disclosure Act of 2005, H.R. Res. 1362, 109th Cong.
(2005) (requiring hospitals and ambulatory surgery centers to disclose charges for
their twenty-five most frequently performed inpatient and outpatient procedures,
and their fifty most frequently administered drugs dispensed to inpatients).
295. See generally UPDATE ON CONSUMER MEDICAL DEBT, supra note 264
(describing changes in hospital billing and collections).
296. See id. (summarizing changes to alleviate consumer medical debt).
297. See id.
298. See id. (considering voluntary versus regulatory approaches). Another
study announced in October 2005 made similar findings, observing that many non-
profit hospitals across the nation have expanded their charity care to include slid-
ing scale discounted rates depending on the patients' income levels. See CTR. FOR
STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, BALANCING MARGIN AND MISSION: HOSPITALS ALTER
BILLING AND COLLECTION PRACTICES OF UNINSURED PATIENTS 3-4 (2005), available at
http://hschange.org/CONTENT/788/788.pdf.
299. See Tenet Announces Proposed Settlement of Suits Alleging Overcharging of Unin-
sured, 14 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 353, 353 (2005) (describing proposed settlement).
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settlement requires the hospital to give estimates of charges and financial
counseling to uninsured patients, to provide discounted pricing at man-
aged care rates, to offer reasonable installment payment schedules, to re-
frain from suing uninsured patients and to refrain from placing liens on
homes of uninsured patients. 30 0 In addition, Tenet agreed to make re-
funds to uninsured patients who had received treatments between June
15, 1999 and December 31, 2004 and who had paid more than a given
percentage of gross charges, with the percentages varying by year of treat-
ment.3 0 1 Tenet stated that the terms of the proposed settlement are con-
sistent with its compact with uninsured patients announced in 2003.302
The California Superior Court approved the settlement on August 5,
2005. 303
Other settlements have been reached as a result of the Minnesota At-
torney General's investigation of hospitals' charity care practices. 30 4 A set-
tlement with Fairview Health Services allows uninsured patients and
families earning up to 450% of the federal poverty level to receive dis-
counted pricing.3 0 5 Fairview is also required to reform its debt collection
methods, which had included suing indigent patients, garnishing their
wages and sending debt collectors after them. 30 6 Settlements announced
on May 5, 2005, with four other Minnesota hospitals require the hospitals
to charge the uninsured and patients with annual incomes less than
$125,000 no more than the hospitals charge their private payor providing
A copy of the proposed Tenet Settlement Agreement is available online. See Pro-
posed Tenet Settlement, http://op.bna.com/hI.nsf/id/psts-6agrfn/ (follow "Pro-
posed Tenet Settlement.pdf" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 20, 2005).
300. See Tenet Announces Proposed Settlement of Suits Alleging Overcharging of Unin-
sured, supra note 299, at 354.
301. See id. at 353 (noting that Tenet estimates it billed $400 million in
charges between June 15, 1999 and December 31, 2004).
302. See id. at 354 (describing stratified Tenet refund policy for uninsured
patients). For a further description of individual hospitals' voluntary election to
modify uninsured billing practices, see supra notes 299-301 and infra notes 303-12
and accompanying text.
303. See Judge Approves Nationwide Settlement of Allegations Tenet Overcharged Un-
insured, 14 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1088, 1088 (2005).
304. See Fairview Health Services, Minnesota AG Reach Deal on Charity Care, Debt
Collection, 14 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 514, 514 (2005); Press Release, State of Minn.,
Office of the Attorney Gen., Agreement Between Attorney General and Minnesota
Hospitals Will Provide Fair Pricing to Uninsured Patients, Establish Code of Con-
duct for Debt Collection Practices (May 5, 2005) [hereinafter Press Release, Agree-
ment Between Attorney General and Minnesota Hospitals], available at http://
www.ag.state.mn.us/consumer/PR/PR_050505HospitalFairPricing.htm (announc-
ing reduced rates for uninsured patients participating in Allina Health System,
North Memorial Health Care, Park Nicollet Health Services and HealthEast Care
System).
305. See Fairview Health Services, Minnesota AG Reach Deal on Charity Care, Debt
Collection, supra note 304, at 514.
306. See id.
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the most revenue to the hospital.30 7 The settlements also require the hos-
pitals to offer free or discounted care to eligible patients, to offer payment
plans to patients who cannot pay the entire bill at once and to soften col-
lections practices. 308
Most recently, uninsured patients and the Providence Health System
reportedly reached a settlement in a charity class action, announced on
November 1, 2005.309 Providence has reportedly agreed to discount its
billings to all uninsured patients to equal its average insured rates.3 10
Providence also will give additional discounts ranging from 100% (to un-
insured patients who earn 200% or less of the federal poverty level) to
10% (to uninsured patients who earn up to 400% of the federal poverty
level). 3 1' Providence has agreed to apply the discounts to patients who
received services at Providence for the past four years, and to patients who
receive services for the next two years.3 12
XI. CONCLUSIONS
The changes that have recently taken place regarding hospitals' indi-
gent billing and collections practices are so obviously rooted in common
sense, it is a wonder they have not occurred before this time. Obviously,
hospital rates for the uninsured should not be the highest rates the hospi-
tals bill to all payors.3 1 3 Once indigency is determined, either on a case by
case basis or more globally using the federal poverty level as a benchmark,
the uninsured should be billed at rates that are at least on par with those
paid by governmental programs and private insurers.3 14 It is likely that
307. See, e.g., Agreement, In re Allina Health Systems, No. CI-05-4576, slip op.
at 13-14 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 5, 2005), available at http://www.ag.state.mn.us/con-
sumer/PDF/PR/HspAgrAllina.pdf (stating settlement provisions).
308. See Press Release, Agreement Between Attorney General and Minnesota
Hospitals, supra note 304 (delineating specifics of agreement that State Senator
Ann Rest describes as "overall system of fairness"). A settlement has also been
reached in Servedio v. Our Lady of the Resurrection Medical Center, but the terms of the
settlement are confidential. See Settlement of Uninsured Lawsuit in Illinois Against Res-
urrection Health Care Confirmed, 14 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 760, 760 (2005).
309. See Settlement Reached Between Oregon Nonprofit Hospital, Uninsured Patients,
14 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1433, 1433-34 (2005).
310. See id. at 1433 (reporting average discount for preferred provider rate as
thirty-one percent).
311. See id. (reporting sliding scale discounts).
312. See id. at 1433-34 (announcing application of agreement both retroac-
tively and prospectively).
313. Health policy expert Uwe Reinhardt has termed this type of pricing "bru-
tal and inhumane." See WORKING POOR, supra note 73, at 7. New York Legal Aid
Society attorney Elisabeth Benjamin called it "the secret shame of the U.S. health-
care system." See Lagnado, House Panel Begins Inquiry into Hospital Billing Practices,
supra note 138 (quoting Elisabeth Benjamin).
314. Some suggestions are that the uninsured should be billed at a rate that is
higher than the rates paid by insurers and managed care plans, so that the market-
place will not be disrupted, such as the Medicare DRG rate plus twenty-five per-
cent, or the highest rate the hospital charges to any insurer or managed care plan.
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reducing rates (and interest rates on unpaid bills) for the uninsured will
not even have a substantial fiscal impact on hospitals, because as the hospi-
tals themselves insist, they were rarely able to collect full charges from the
uninsured anyway.
315
For hospitals that utilized aggressive collections tactics for this popula-
tion, it is obvious that the collections should be conducted in a more hu-
mane manner. As many commentators have observed, medical debt is not
like other debt, as it is not voluntarily assumed, and as the Journal articles
pointed out, tens of thousands of dollars in hospital bills may be incurred
suddenly, without warning and after only a few days of inpatient care.
3 16
Obviously, if a hospital has a charity care policy that offers free or dis-
counted care to indigents, the hospital should tell qualified patients about
it and make that assistance available to them. Hospital staffers should be
schooled about their institution's charity care policy, and should be help-
ful and sympathetic in assisting patients with their applications. Once in-
digency is determined, collections should not be effected by means of
residential foreclosures, wage garnishments that leave the working poor
unable to meet their basic needs or body attachments. To quote Ray
Sweeney of HANYS, the only sensible rule is: "Don't try to get blood from
a stone.'
317
See Hearing, supra note 1, at 16 (statement of Gerard F. Anderson, Director, Johns
Hopkins Center for Hospital, Finance and Management) (suggesting rate method-
ologies for indigent patients).
315. See id. at 4 (statement of Rep. James C. Greenwood, Member, Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations)
(referring to December 2002 remarks by Trevor Fetter, CEO of Tenet Healthcare,
noting that seventy percent of uninsured patients do not pay their bills); id. at 98
(statement of Herbert Pardes, President and CEO of New York Presbyterian Hospi-
tal) (remarking that New York Presbyterian Hospital collects only twelve to thir-
teen percent of charges for services furnished to uninsured patients); Tenet
Announces Proposed Settlement of Suits Alleging Overcharging of Uninsured, supra note
299, at 354 ("If the uninsured as a class were not paying the managed care prices in
the aggregate, then a reduction in rates would probably have little impact on the
bottom line." (quotingJ. Mark Waxman, General Counsel of Caregroup, Boston));
see also CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, BALANCING MARGIN AND MISSION:
HOsPITALS ALTER BILLING AND COLLECTION PRACTICES FOR UNINSURED PATIENTS 5
(2005), available at http://hschange.org/CONTENT/788/788.pdf (confirming
that "changes in billing and collection policies have had negligible impact on hos-
pital finances to date").
316. See, e.g., Lagnado, Taming Hospital Billing, supra note 283 (stating that
"hospital bills are by nature different from other consumer debt-such as bills for
washing machines-because most patients didn't choose to incur them"). Other
sources support this proposition by stating:
Health care is a business unlike most others .... [T]heir product is essen-
tial and often life saving .... Purchases are often sudden and unplanned
and, particularly for people without health insurance, may bring large
financial burdens that are involuntary in the sense that they are not the
result of a traditional consumer choice.
CONSEQUENCES OF MEDICAL DEBT, supra note 76, at 2.
317. See Lagnado, Cold-Case Files: Dunned for Old Bills, Poor Find Some Hospitals
Never Forget, supra note 98.
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While the focus of uninsured charges has been almost exclusively on
hospitals, we should also bear in mind that the same system of charges for
the uninsured can occur with regard to other types of healthcare providers
as well, including physicians, dentists, medical device suppliers, pharma-
cies, etc.3 18 Relief from charges should be broadened to include the full
range of providers who charge the uninsured at the uppermost limit of the
providers' rates.3
19
The expos6 on hospital billing and collections practices for the unin-
sured has not been a proud chapter in healthcare history. Had it not been
for a single reporter at the Journal, it is possible that the issue of hospital
charges for the uninsured might still remain largely hidden from public
view. 320 While it is understandable that hospitals legitimately may have
believed that tampering with their charge schedules to give rate relief to
the uninsured would have exposed them to anti-kickback risk and
threatened them with lower Medicare reimbursements, this does not ex-
cuse hospitals for their silence.3 2 1 Nor could regulatory concerns ever jus-
tify practices like those by the Carle Foundation, which first treated an
uninsured patient for attempted suicide and then later had him arrested
for not paying his bill.
322
The government and the private insurance industry also are not free
from blame. They too were certainly aware that a substantial segment of
middle America was being victimized by exorbitant hospital charges, but
failed to take action to publicize the issue or lobby for change. While the
class action lawyers may assert that they acted swiftly to attempt to right
this wrong, in fact they flooded into the federal courts with legal theories
318. See, e.g., Lagnado, Full Price, supra note 33 (reporting case of Rebekah
Nix, who was billed at full charges by her anesthesiologist and other doctors who
treated her at hospital because she did not have health insurance).
319. See UPDATE ON CONSUMER MEDicAL DEBT, supra note 264 (stating that
efforts to alleviate medical debt should include all types of healthcare providers);
see also H.B. 805, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Al. 2004) (proposing limits on charges to
uninsured by full range of healthcare providers, including physicians, dentists, hos-
pitals and other healthcare professionals).
320. For a further discussion of Lucette Lagnado's articles on hospital
charges to uninsured patients, see supra notes 23-66 and accompanying text.
321. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of Rep. James C. Greenwood,
Member, H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Chairman, Subcomm. on Over-
sight and Investigations) (stating that "[i]f hospitals believed that Medicare rules
created roadblocks to doing the right thing for the uninsured, why did they not
raise it with HHS earlier").
322. See Lagnado, Medical Seizures, supra note 59 (reporting Carle Founda-
tion's execution of body attachment on uninsured part-time musician whose origi-
nal treatment at Carle was for self-inflicted gunshot wound in botched suicide
attempt); see also WORKING POOR, supra note 73, at 7 (describing case of Rose Shaf-
fer, billed $18,000 for three days of inpatient care for heart attack, reported to be
suffering from the stress of being sued by hospital over bill and quoted as saying,
"[t]he hospital saved my life and now they're trying to take it").
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that were plainly unsupportable under current law. 32 3 The Kolari court
aptly described the federal claims as "bootless" and "without basis in law,"
and referred to the plaintiffs as "hav[ing] lost their way." 324 So far, all that
the class actions have accomplished is to drain thousands of dollars out of
hospitals for defense costs that could have been allocated to charity
care.
325
Finally, even with the changes that are now occurring to make hospi-
tals a kinder and gentler place for the uninsured, the basic problems that
the uninsured face in obtaining necessary medical care have not changed
much. Hospital bills, even at prevailing managed care rates, will probably
continue to be beyond the means of the working poor or the unemployed
to pay. This population will continue to be subject to collections, albeit of
discounted amounts, with only the most aggressive collections tactics be-
ing abandoned. 326 As some healthcare experts have observed, the only
real answer is to make basic coverage health insurance available for
everyone. 327
323. For a further analysis of legal arguments asserted by class action attor-
neys against hospitals that were rejected by federal courts, see supra notes 205-43
and accompanying text.
324. See Kolari v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Hosp., 382 F. Supp. 2d 562, 566 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
325. For example, Tenet has agreed to pay $11 million for plaintiffs' attorneys
fees to settle the charity care class actions against it. See Proposed Tenet Settle-
ment, supra note 299 (presenting terms of agreement). Further, the administra-
tive burden of the class actions is evident, as Tenet produced 1.2 million pages of
documents during negotiations over the settlement. See id. (commenting on volu-
minous documents produced during negotiations).
326. See, e.g., Lucette Lagnado, New York State Hospitals Agree to Cut Prices for
Uninsured, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2004, at BI (criticizing Healthcare Association of
New York State's charity care guidelines because hospitals "can still charge 9%
interest, they can still grab your paycheck, they can still sue you, [and] they can put
liens on your house" (quoting Elisabeth Benjamin, healthcare attorney with New
York Legal Aid Society)).
327. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 1, at 92 (remarking that "[t]he problem is
how are we as a society going to guarantee that every American has some form of
health insurance" (quoting Jack 0. Bovender, Jr., Chairman and CEO, Hospital
Corporation of America)).
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